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Thirteen percent of the population of the United States is over the age of sixty-
five.1  Twenty-five percent of these sixty-five-year-olds will live past the age of 
ninety, and ten percent will live past the age of ninety-five. 2   Unless 
demographics change radically, by the year 2030 more than one-fifth of the 
population of the United States will be over the age of sixty-five.3  While these 
statistics seem salutary, they imply the stark reality complementing advanced 
age: seventy percent of all aging citizens will need some form of long-term care, 
and many will require nursing home assistance that can cost more than ninety 
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 1. LORAINE A. WEST, SAMANTHA COLE, DANIEL GOODKIND & WAN HE, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, 65+ IN THE UNITED STATES: 2010 3 (2014), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/ 
Census/library/publications/2014/demo/p23-212.pdf. 
 2. Calculators: Life Expectancy, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., http://www.ssa.gov/planners/life 
expectancy.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2015). 
 3. WEST, COLE, GOODKIND & HE, supra note 1, at 5 tbl.1-1. 
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thousand dollars each year based on estimates for 2015.4   These costs will 
continue to rise, especially in densely populated areas of the country where the 
need for long-term care is the greatest.5  To meet the significant cost of long-
term residential care, some persons—and their families—will self-pay from 
family assets.6  An increasing number of persons will pay for care with newer 
and more advantageous insurance policies formulated for long-term care,7 but a 
significant number of Americans needing long-term care will depend upon 
Medicaid to cover the cost.8 
Medicaid is a joint federal-state partnership program enacted in 1965 to 
provide medical care to the elderly, the blind, and the disabled poor.9  The 
federal financial contribution towards each state’s Medicaid expenses may not 
be less than fifty percent or more than eighty-three percent.10  This program is 
distinct from Medicare, a singular federal program providing medical care for 
                                                             
 4. TREVOR TOMPSON, JENNIFER BENZ, JENNIFER AGIESTA, DENNIS JUNIUS, KIM NGUYEN 
& KRISTINA LOWELL, THE ASSOC. PRESS-NORC CTR. FOR PUB. AFFAIRS RESEARCH, LONG-
TERM CARE: PERCEPTIONS, EXPERIENCES, AND ATTITUDES AMONG AMERICANS 40 OR OLDER 1 
(2013), http://www.apnorc.org/PDFs/Long%20Term%20Care/AP_NORC_Long%20Term%20 
Care%20Perception_FINAL%20REPORT.pdf; GENWORTH FIN., INC., COST OF CARE SURVEY 
2015 17 (2015), https://www.genworth.com/dam/Americas/US/PDFs/Consumer/corporate/130 
568_040115_gnw.pdf (estimating the median annual cost for a private room in a nursing home in 
the United States). 
 5. See, e.g., Enrique Zamora, Deborah Nodar & Krista Ogletree, Long-Term Care 
Insurance: A Life Raft for Baby Boomers, 26 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 79, 85 (2013) (“According to 
the 2012 MetLife Market Survey of Nursing Home, Assisted Living, Adult Day Services, and 
Home Care Costs, the average costs for varying levels of long-term care continue to increase.”) 
(citing METLIFE MATURE MARKET INST., THE 2012 METLIFE MARKET SURVEY OF NURSING 
HOME, ASSISTED LIVING, ADULT DAY SERVICES, AND HOME CARE COSTS 4 (2012), https:// 
www.metlife.com/assets/cao/mmi/publications/studies/2012/studies/mmi-2012-market-survey-
long-term-care-costs.pdf); U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Assisted Living, 
LONGTERMCARE.GOV, http://longtermcare.gov/where-you-live-matters/living-in-a-facility/ 
assisted-living/ (last visited Sept. 14, 2015) (noting that assisted living costs “can be higher in urban 
areas”). 
 6. See, e.g., Paying for Long-Term Care, NIH SENIOR HEALTH, http://nihseniorhealth.gov/ 
longtermcare/payingforlongtermcare/01.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2015) (“At first, many people 
pay for long-term care services with their own money . . . [including] personal savings, a pension 
or other retirement fund, income from stocks and bonds, or proceeds from the sale of a home.”). 
 7. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, RISING DEMAND FOR LONG-TERM SERVICES AND 
SUPPORTS FOR ELDERLY PEOPLE 28 (2013), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/113th-
congress-2013-2014/reports/44363-LTC.pdf (noting that while the number of people with long-
term care insurance increased by approximately twelve percent from 1998 to 2005, growth has 
slowed in recent years as “the age group most likely to purchase [long-term care insurance] . . . 
reach[es] its peak as a share of the U.S. population”). 
 8. See, e.g., Michael Gilfix & Bernard A. Krooks, The High Cost of Aging, 151 TRS. & ESTS. 
43, 43 (2012) (noting that Medicaid is “the primary payer” of long-term care in the United States). 
 9. Medicaid Information, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., https://www.socialsecurity.gov/disability 
research/wi/medicaid.htm (last visited Aug. 25, 2015). 
 10. ALISON MITCHELL & EVELYNE P. BAUMRUCKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42941, 
MEDICAID’S FEDERAL MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PERCENTAGE (FMAP), FY2014 2 (2013), 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42941.pdf. 
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Americans over the age of sixty-five and for persons of any age qualifying as 
disabled.11  Medicare is not dependent on qualifying as poor; anyone over the 
age of sixty-five who is eligible to receive Social Security retirement benefits 
may qualify for the program.12  In addition to eligibility requirements, there are 
significant differences between Medicaid and Medicare.  First, Medicare does 
not pay for residential long-term care benefits whereas Medicaid will do so; 
Medicare provides a limited reimbursement benefit for skilled nursing care and 
then only for a specified period of time. 13   Second, Medicare is a federal 
program, while Medicaid is a joint federal-state program, so states must make a 
financial contribution, prompting greater state vigilance.14   Third, Medicaid 
eligibility requirements may vary among the states, but state rules are bound by 
certain federal standards.15 
Even though Medicaid provides medical services to an eligible recipient, the 
focus of this Article will be premised on Medicaid’s payment for long-term care 
for nursing homes, assisted living, or increasingly, in-home care.  Because 
Medicare will not pay for long-term care—but Medicaid will—millions of 
persons in need of such care seek to “spend-down” income or assets in order to 
qualify as sufficiently needy or poor. 16   Elder law attorneys and prescient 
individuals have created masterful “spend down” plans that allow clients to 
qualify as poor, thereby becoming eligible for Medicaid’s long-term care 
benefits. 17   Once an individual qualifies, he or she can shift financial 
responsibility to pay for the care from the individual recipient to state Medicaid 
offices.18  The qualifications for eligibility became more relaxed when Congress 
                                                             
 11. What’s Medicare?, MEDICARE.GOV, https://www.medicare.gov/sign-up-change-plans/ 
decide-how-to-get-medicare/whats-medicare/what-is-medicare.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2015). 
 12. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., SSA PUBL’N NO. 05-10043, MEDICARE 5 (2015), http://www. 
socialsecurity.gov/pubs/EN-05-10043.pdf. 
 13. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., CMS PROD. NO. 02174, YOUR GUIDE TO 
CHOOSING A NURSING HOME OR OTHER LONG-TERM CARE 5 (2015), https://www.medicare.gov/ 
Pubs/pdf/02174.pdf. 
 14. VICTORIA WACHINO, ANDY SCHNEIDER & DAVID ROUSSEAU, KAISER COMM’N ON 
MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, FINANCING THE MEDICAID PROGRAM: THE MANY ROLES OF 
FEDERAL AND STATE MATCHING FUNDS 15‒17 (2004), https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files. 
wordpress.com/2013/01/financing-the-medicaid-program-the-many-roles-of-federal-and-state-
matching-funds-policy-brief.pdf. 
 15. Eligibility, MEDICAID.GOV, http://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid-chip-program-
information/by-topics/eligibility/eligibilty.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2015) (explaining that state 
eligibility criteria must conform with federal standards, but may expand coverage with a waiver 
from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services). 
 16. See Roloff v. Sullivan, 975 F.2d 333, 337‒38 (7th Cir. 1992) (discussing the income 
spend-down process). 
 17. See April Rudin, Discussing LongTerm Family Care During Thanksgiving, ALL GLOBAL 
NEWS ON ONE PAGE (Nov. 23, 2010), http://www.allword-news.co.uk/2010/11/23/page/4. 
 18. See MARYBETH MUSUMECI, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., THE AFFORDABLE 
CARE ACT’S IMPACT ON MEDICAID ELIGIBILITY, ENROLLMENT, AND BENEFITS FOR PEOPLE WITH 
DISABILITIES 5 (2014), https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2014/04/8390-02-the-
affordable-care-acts-impact-on-medicaid-eligibility.pdf. 
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provided for the protection of applicants’ spouses by permitting the shifting of 
assets to protect marital property rights. 19   Protections allow the non-
institutionalized spouse to freeze marital assets for the duration of the lives of 
both of the parties, thereby protecting the spouse against probable 
impoverishment.20  But then, at the death of the latter of the two spouses, the 
state may seek recovery of expenditures through estate recovery programs.21 
Estate recovery is a nascent area of the law; this fact is reflected in the various 
state statutes governing the process.22  When Congress permitted spouses to 
exempt certain assets to protect one or both of the spouses, it also specified that 
states eventually could recover expenditures made.23  But while the states could 
enact recovery procedures that did not exceed federal specifications, the states 
have been slow to respond,24 and some states have seen their efforts stymied by 
litigation over the interpretation of federal Medicaid legislation and threats of 
preemption.25  The issues raised in this Article suggest that there will be an 
increasing number of cases throughout the United States.  But states have no 
recourse other than to become increasingly vigilant in pursuing private funds to 
pay for Medicaid expenditures.  Concomitantly, elderly citizens and their 
families face uncertainty about what will become of family homes, annuities, 
and other property pursued to pay for long-term care stretching back years and 
perhaps decades. 
This Article addresses three specific issues that have arisen concerning estate 
recovery statutes and how federal and state interaction has resulted in 
uncertainty among state courts, elder law attorneys, and persons seeking to 
qualify for Medicaid long-term care payments.  First, what constitutes an 
“estate” for purposes of recovery of assets to pay for long-term care 
expenditures?  Second, if assets of a Medicaid recipient are transferred during 
lifetime, thereby depriving the Medicaid recipient or the recipient’s spouse of an 
interest in the asset at the time of death, is it permissible to trace the transferred 
assets for estate recovery?  And third, should an annuity purchased to provide 
exempt income for a recipient’s spouse be considered a resource sufficient to 
disqualify an applicant from Medicaid eligibility? 
The three issues discussed in this Article have arisen as a result of federal 
legislation.  A brief legislative history will demonstrate the progression of 
                                                             
 19. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(a)‒(d) (2012) (providing rules for the treatment of income of 
institutionalized spouses).  See also U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., POLICY BRIEF #3, 
SPOUSES OF MEDICAID LONG-TERM CARE RECIPIENTS 1‒2, 5, 7‒11 (2005), http://aspe.hhs.gov/ 
sites/default/files/pdf/74086/spouses.pdf. 
 20. See infra note 30 and accompanying text. 
 21. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., POLICY BRIEF #1, MEDICAID ESTATE 
RECOVERY 1‒2, 6‒7 (2005), http://aspe.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/74101/estaterec.pdf. 
 22. See infra note 125 and accompanying text. 
 23. See infra note 112 and accompanying text. 
 24. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., POLICY BRIEF #1, supra note 21, at 5. 
 25. See, e.g., Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. McCormick, 283 P.3d 785, 787‒89 (Idaho 
2012) (addressing whether federal law preempted the state’s ability to recover from an estate). 
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federal statutes and corresponding state regulations pertaining to estate recovery.  
The judicial debate over the federal mandate and the corresponding state 
statutory interpretations are relatively recent, and the three issues discussed in 
this Article—although not isolated from other legal obscurities—are important 
enough to long-term care planning to warrant scrutiny.  More significantly, these 
three issues suggest that more comprehensive legislation is needed to effectively 
recover expenditures made from the estates of Medicaid recipients and their 
spouses.  The conclusion of this Article will offer suggestions as to how 
Congress may modify sections of the Medicaid statute to better accommodate 
issues arising at the state level.  Congress needs to provide clarity to meet the 
needs of the states and an expanding segment of the population. 
I.  HISTORY OF MEDICAID ELIGIBILITY FOR LONG-TERM CARE 
Costs associated with care can be significant.26  As one study points out, 
“[f]ifty percent of individuals over 85 will need assistance with daily 
functioning, and their home care can cost from $55,000 to $75,000 a year and 
up to $180,000 annually for nursing home care.”27  Prior to the codification of 
measures intended to protect spouses of institutionalized persons,28 whatever 
assets were accumulated by a married couple were often exhausted after paying 
for the care of one spouse, leaving the non-institutionalized spouse impoverished 
in the event that he or she survived the institutionalized spouse.29  Incrementally, 
federal legislation—beginning in 1988 with the Medicare Catastrophic 
Coverage Act (MCCA) and most significantly revamped in 2005 with the 
Deficit Reduction Act (DRA)—provided some protection to the non-
institutionalized spouse by exempting income and assets.30  Eventually these 
exempt assets became the subject of estate recovery programs seeking to recoup 
expenditures made for an institutionalized spouse. 31   The programs were 
                                                             
 26. Russell N. Adler, Peter J. Strauss & Regina Kiperman, America’s Long-Term Care Crisis, 
152 TRS. & ESTS. 44, 44 (2013). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Medicaid defines an institutionalized spouse as someone who is married to a non-
institutionalized spouse and is likely to be in long-term care for at least thirty consecutive days.  See 
42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(h)(1)(B) (2012). 
 29. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-37 (West 2015) (providing that spouses are 
jointly liable to support their family and for specified expenses).  The duty to provide necessaries 
can prompt spouses to divorce.  See Andrea B. Carroll, Incentivizing Divorce, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1925, 1926‒27 (2009). 
 30. See infra notes 55, 78 and accompanying text.  “Asset” is often used interchangeably with 
“resources” in relevant federal law; the Social Security Program Operations Manual System 
(POMS) defines resources as “cash and any other personal property, as well as any real property, 
that an individual (or spouse, if any): owns; has the right, authority, or power to convert to cash (if 
not already cash); and is not legally restricted from using for his/her support and maintenance.”  
SOC. SEC. ADMIN., PROGRAM OPERATIONS MANUAL SYSTEM § SI 01110.100, DISTINCTION 
BETWEEN ASSETS AND RESOURCES (2015), https://secure.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/0501110100. 
 31. See, e.g., infra note 108 and accompanying text. 
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mandated by Congress and illustrated a common theme: that “Medicaid has 
always been intended to be ‘the payer of last resort.’”32 
Estate recovery programs originate with Medicaid’s eligibility requirements, 
which are based on federal income and asset limits.33  To be considered poor and 
thus entitled to Medicaid, the total value of the applicant’s assets, excluding 
income, at the time of the application and throughout the time he or she is 
receiving Medicaid benefits, cannot exceed $2,000 for an individual and $3,000 
for a married couple when they both apply for benefits.34  Federal legislation 
such as the DRA,35 and various regulations issued by the Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid, affect these limits and specify penalties for violations of the 
guidelines.36  Once an applicant is determined to be eligible for Medicaid long-
term care benefits, Medicaid will seek to provide care in what is intended to be 
the “least restrictive alternative” placement, such as assisted living or in-home 
placement.37  States are permitted to offer a variety of long-term care placement 
options as long as these options meet certain federal minimum standards.38 
There are additional limits on what a state may recover from the estate of an 
institutionalized recipient.39  First, notice of the estate recovery program must 
                                                             
 32. See Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. McCormick, 283 P.3d 785, 788 (Idaho 2012) (quoting 
Ark. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268, 291 (2006)). 
 33. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., POLICY BRIEF #1, supra note 21, at 1.  The 
Department of Health and Human Services states: 
Medicaid imposes stringent limits on income and assets of recipients, consistent with its 
mission to provide a health care safety net for the poor and for those whose personal 
resources are insufficient to pay the full cost of care.  In order to fulfill this mission, 
Medicaid also recovers expenses paid on behalf of recipients from their estates under 
certain circumstances. 
Id.  See also 42 U.S.C. § 1382a(a) (2012) (defining categories of income).  Income may be defined 
as any cash or in-kind benefits that could conceivably enable the recipient to obtain food or shelter.  
See 20 C.F.R. § 416.1103 (2015).  Not counted as income are items defined as medical care, need-
based assistance, or income derived from other family members not available to the applicant.  See 
id. 
 34. 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a)(3)(B). 
 35. See, e.g., id. § 1396p(c)(1) (modifying the look-back period and method of disqualifying 
transfers made during this period). 
 36. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 435.2 (2015) (establishing Medicaid eligibility rules).  See also 
Letter from Dennis G. Smith to State Medical Director, Ctrs. for Medicaid & Medicare Servs., U.S. 
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. (July 27, 2006), http://www.medicaid.gov/Federal-Policy-
Guidance/downloads/SMD072706b.pdf. 
 37. Olmstead v. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 602 n.18 (1999).  See also 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a), (e), 
(f) (2012) (allowing waivers from Medicaid requirements to be obtained); Waivers, 
MEDICAID.GOV, http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/ 
Waivers/Waivers.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2015). 
 38. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A). 
 39. See generally id. § 1396a(a)(18) (specifying that state plans must comply with provisions 
of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p). 
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be given whenever any person applies for Medicaid long-term care assistance.40  
Second, the state may only seek recovery for long-term care monetary benefits 
paid to a person at least fifty-five years of age.41  Third, the state may not 
institute any recovery program against Medicare savings plans.42  Fourth, the 
state may not recover assets during the lifetime of the institutionalized recipient, 
but only upon his or her death, the death of the non-institutionalized spouse, and 
the death of any child with a disability or a child under the age of twenty-one.43  
Fifth, the home of a recipient is exempt from estate recovery programs if a 
sibling lives at the home and has done so for at least a year, or a child lives at 
home and has done so for at least two years and has provided care to the 
recipient, helping to keep the recipient at home.44  A sixth federal limit is the 
requirement that each state implement a hardship program to exempt some 
estates from recovery.45  As can be expected, state policies vary, but poverty and 
                                                             
 40. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., STATE MEDICAID MANUAL PART 3‒ 
ELIGIBILITY § 3810(G) (2001), http://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Guidance/ 
Transmittals/downloads/r75sm3.pdf. 
 41. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(1)(B). 
 42. Id. § 1396p(b)(1)(B)(ii). 
 43. See id. § 1396p(b)(2)(A).  The statute provides: 
Any adjustment or recovery under paragraph (1) may be made only after the death of the 
individual’s surviving spouse, if any, and only at a time—(A) when he has no surviving 
child who is under the age 21, or (with respect to States eligible to participate in the State 
program established under subchapter XVI of this chapter) is blind or permanently and 
totally disabled, or (with respect to States which are not eligible to participate in such 
program) is blind or disabled as defined in section 1382c of this title. 
Id. 
 44. See id. § 1396p(b)(2)(B).  The provision states: 
[I]n the case of a lien on an individual’s home under subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section, 
when—(i) no sibling of the individual (who was residing in the individual’s home for a 
period of at least one year immediately before the date of the individual’s admission to 
the medical institution), and (ii) no son or daughter of the individual (who was residing 
in the individual’s home for a period of at least two years immediately before the date of 
the individual’s admission to the medical institution, and who establishes to the 
satisfaction of the State that he or she provided care to such individual which permitted 
such individual to reside at home rather than in an institution), is lawfully residing in 
such home who has lawfully resided in such home on a continuous basis since the date 
of the individual’s admission to the medical institution. 
Id. 
 45. Id. § 1396p(b)(3)(A) (“The State shall establish procedures (in accordance with standards 
specified by the Secretary) under which the agency shall waive the application of this subsection 
(other than paragraph (1)(C)) if such application would work an undue hardship as determined on 
the basis of criteria established by the Secretary.”). 
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family dysfunction appear as common denominators of hardship.46  A few state 
statutes delineate considerations to determine undue hardship.47 
A seventh limitation on state estate recovery programs involves state 
sponsored asset protection long-term care insurance policies.48  Sometimes these 
                                                             
 46. See, e.g., West Virginia v. Thompson, 475 F.3d 204, 206, 208 (4th Cir. 2007) (affirming 
the State Medicaid Manual hardship exemption for homes that are worth fifty percent or less of the 
average price of homes in the county where the home is located and rejecting a state’s ruling that a 
home worth more than this was worthy of the hardship exemption).  See also Estate of Nicholson 
v. S.C. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 660 S.E.2d 303, 306 (S.C. Ct. App. 2008) (stating that a 
son’s imprisonment did not warrant a hardship waiver from the requirement that he actually live in 
the home to prevent recovery). 
 47. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-76-436(b)(2) (West 2015).  The statute provides: 
In determining the existence of an undue hardship, the department shall consider factors 
including, but not limited to, the following: (A) The asset subject to recovery is the sole 
income-producing asset of the beneficiaries of the estate of the grantee of a beneficiary 
deed under § 18-12-608; (B) Without receipt of the beneficiary deed or proceeds of the 
estate, a grantee or beneficiary would become eligible for federal or state benefits; (C) 
Allowing a grantee of a beneficiary deed under § 18-12-608 to receive the interest under 
the beneficiary deed or a beneficiary to receive the inheritance from the estate would 
enable the grantee or beneficiary to discontinue eligibility for federal or state benefits; 
(D) The asset subject to recovery is a home with a value of fifty percent (50%) or less of 
the average price of homes in the county where the homestead is located, as of the date 
of the deceased recipient’s death; or (E) There are other compelling circumstances. 
Id.  But see MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 400.112g(3)(e)(iii) (West 2015) (providing for “[a] 
rebuttable presumption that no hardship exists if the hardship resulted from estate planning methods 
under which assets were diverted in order to avoid estate recovery.”). 
 48. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(1)(C)(iii).  The statute provides: 
[T]he term “qualified State long-term care insurance partnership” means an approved 
State plan amendment under this subchapter that provides for the disregard of any assets 
or resources in an amount equal to the insurance benefit payments that are made to or on 
behalf of an individual who is a beneficiary under a long-term care insurance policy if 
the following requirements are met: (I) The policy covers an insured who was a resident 
of such State when coverage first became effective under the policy.  (II) The policy is a 
qualified long-term care insurance policy (as defined in section 7702B(b) of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986 [Title 26, U.S.C.A.]) issued not earlier than the effective date of 
the State plan amendment.  (III) The policy meets the model regulations and the 
requirements of the model Act specified in paragraph (5).  (IV) If the policy is sold to an 
individual who—(aa) has not attained the age of 61 as of the date of purchase, the policy 
provides compound annual inflation protection; (bb) has attained age 61 but has not 
attained age 76 as of such date, the policy provides some level of inflation protection; 
and (cc) has attained the age 76 as of such date, the policy may (but is not required to) 
provide some level of inflation protection.  (V) The State Medicaid agency under section 
1396a(a)(5) of this title provides information and technical assistance to the State 
insurance department on the insurance department’s role of assuring that any individual 
who sells a long-term care insurance policy under this partnership receives training and 
demonstrates evidence of an understanding of such policies and how they relate to other 
public and private coverage of long-term care.  (VI) The issuer of the policy provides 
regular reports to the Secretary, in accordance with regulations of the Secretary, that 
include notification regarding when benefits provided under the policy have been paid 
and the amount of such benefits paid, notification regarding when the policy otherwise 
terminates, and such other information as the Secretary determines may be appropriate 
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policies are referred to as “partnership policies” and are means by which the 
states may offset state-paid long-term costs with private insurance proceeds.49  
Almost all of the states offer these policies, but only a few states offered them 
in 1993 when the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act grandfathered the few 
that did into an accepted practice.50  Furthermore, the DRA fostered the growth 
of these policies, specifically Section 6021, and today states are permitted to 
offer long-term care insurance policies that allow the applicant to retain assets 
in proportion to the amount of insurance purchased.51  In addition to state plans, 
an increasing number of persons are purchasing private long-term care 
insurance.52  The Department of Health and Human Services has established 
state reciprocity guidelines to ensure recognition among the states.53 
The history of eligibility for Medicaid long-term care and the corresponding 
estate recovery programs is intricately linked to the passage of successive federal 
statutes.54  The recent enactment of these different statutes suggests that states 
continue to develop corresponding regulations, prompting the judicial issues at 
the focus of this Article.  The following statutes form the basis for any discussion 
of state law. 
                                                             
to the administration of such partnerships.  (VII) The State does not impose any 
requirement affecting the terms or benefits of such a policy unless the State imposes such 
requirement on long-term care insurance policies without regard to whether the policy is 
covered under the partnership or is offered in connection with such a partnership.  In the 
case of a long-term care insurance policy which is exchanged for another such policy, 
subchapter (I) shall be applied based on the coverage of the first such policy that was 
exchanged.  For purposes of this clause and paragraph (5), the term “long-term care 
insurance policy” includes a certificate issued under a group insurance contract. 
Id. 
 49. See ERIC M. CARLSON, LONG TERM CARE ADVOCACY § 9.15, Lexis Nexis (database 
updated 2014). 
 50. See TIMOTHY L. TAKACS, ELDER LAW PRACTICE IN TENNESSEE § 6.11[5], Lexis Nexis 
(database updated 2015). 
 51. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(1)(C)(ii) (2012).  The provision states: 
[Estate recovery] shall not apply in the case of an individual who received medical 
assistance under a State plan of a State which had a State plan amendment approved as 
of May 14, 1993, and which satisfies clause (iv), or which has a State plan amendment 
that provides for a qualified State long-term care insurance partnership (as defined in 
clause (iii)) which provided for the disregard of any assets or resources—(I) to the extent 
that payments are made under a long-term care insurance policy; or (II) because an 
individual has received (or is entitled to receive) benefits under a long-term care 
insurance policy. 
Id. 
 52. Beth Slagle & Richard T. Victoria, Long-Term Care Lawsuits Will Just Keep Coming, 
148 TRS. & ESTS. 60, 60 (2009). 
 53. See State Long-Term Care Partnership Program: State Reciprocity Standard, 73 Fed. Reg. 
51,302, 51,303 (Sept. 2, 2008). 
 54. See Eligibility, MEDICAID.GOV, http://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid-chip-program-
information/by-topics/eligibility/eligibility.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2015). 
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A.  Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988 
The MCCA marked the initiation of a legislative process to protect against 
spousal impoverishment.55  Congress passed the legislation with a number of 
goals in mind.56  Specifically, Congress sought to exempt a flow of income to 
the non-institutionalized spouse through: (1) a minimum monthly monetary 
maintenance needs allowance (MMMNA);57 (2) an exemption of certain assets 
through a community spouse resource allowance (CSRA); 58  and (3) an 
exemption to separate the non-institutionalized spouse’s income from the 
institutionalized spouse’s income.59  The purpose of the 1988 legislation was to 
allow the non-institutionalized spouse to continue with his life without the fear 
that everything earned or acquired during his marriage to the institutionalized 
spouse would be spent on the cost of the institutionalized spouse’s long-term 
care.60  The MCCA was a major achievement when it was enacted, even though 
some of its features would be modified by future legislation.61  Among the more 
important aspects of the MCCA are the following: (1) states were permitted but 
not required to recover Medicaid benefits paid to recipients over sixty-five years 
of age; (2) there was no definition of “estate,” although states were told that any 
recovery had to be from the estate of the recipient; (3) recovery from the 
                                                             
 55. See generally Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-360, 102 
Stat. 683.  See also 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(c)(4) (2012); New Mexico v. Div. of Med. Assistance & 
Health Servs., 964 A.2d 822, 826 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009) (quoting Mistrick v. Div. of 
Med. Assistance & Health Servs., 712 A.2d 188, 194 (N.J. 1998)).  The MCCA was repealed by 
the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Repeal Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-234, 103 Stat. 1979, but 
the spousal impoverishment prevention provisions were retained.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(c)(4). 
 56. See Stafford v. Idaho Dep’t. of Health & Welfare, 181 P.3d 456, 460, 463 (Idaho 2008) 
(quoting Cleary ex rel. Cleary v. Waldman, 167 F.3d 801, 805 (3rd Cir. 1999)). 
 57. The minimum monthly maintenance needs allowance is based on a federal formula.  See 
42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(d)(3)‒(4).  The goal is to permit the community spouse (the non-
institutionalized spouse) to receive adequate support, derived from that spouse’s income or, if 
insufficient, the institutionalized spouse’s income.  See id. § 1396r-5(d)(6). 
 58. Id. § 1396r-5(f)(1)‒(2).  A community spouse is defined at 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(h)(2), and 
the federal law specifies certain assets as exempt.  See id. § 1396r-5(h)(2); id. § 1382b(a); 
Hutcherson v. Ariz. Health Care Cost Containment Sys. Admin., 667 F.3d 1066, 1069 (9th Cir. 
2012) (identifying “[a] provision of the MCCA allow[ing] an institutionalized spouse to qualify for 
Medicaid assistance while reserving for the community spouse a capped amount of assets for the 
community spouse’s benefit, known as the ‘community spouse resource allowance’ or ‘CSRA’”). 
 59. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(b)(1).  The MCCA provides that the assets of a non-
institutionalized spouse cannot be revisited once the institutionalized spouse qualifies for Medicaid 
long-term care.  See, e.g., Houghton v. Reinertson, 382 F.3d 1162, 1175 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding 
that Colorado could not review the assets of the non-institutionalized spouse after eligibility is 
determined for the institutionalized spouse).  For a discussion of what constitutes separate property, 
see In re Estate of Wiggins, 306 P.3d 201, 206 (Idaho 2013) (holding that the state may trace 
community property that has been transmuted into separate property). 
 60. See, e.g, Stafford, 181 P.3d at 460 (citing Cleary, 167 F.3d at 805). 
 61. See Thomas R. Oliver, Philip R. Lee & Helene L. Lipton, A Political History of Medicare 
and Prescription Drug Coverage, 82 MILBANK Q. 283, 298‒99, 301 (2004) (noting that the MCCA 
was passed with “large, bipartisan majorities” although “most of [its] major provisions” were 
repealed in 1989). 
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recipient’s estate could only occur at the recipient’s surviving spouse’s death; 
and (4) there was no express mention of recovery from the estate of a surviving 
spouse.62 
The MMMNA shifts income that would be attributable to the institutionalized 
spouse—reducing eligibility for Medicaid long-term care—and makes this 
income available to the non-institutionalized spouse, regardless of the source of 
income.63  The non-institutionalized spouse may keep all of his or her own 
income, but if support is needed, the spouse may obtain only an amount up to 
twenty-five percent of the excess of income over the MMMNA.64  The CSRA 
allows the community spouse to retain a certain amount of resources without 
affecting the eligibility of the institutionalized spouse.65  These exempt assets 
are reflected in the couple’s resources, often assessed by the state Medicaid 
agency at the time of the application for Medicaid long-term care.66  The state 
may not seek recovery for Medicaid expenditures until after both spouses’ 
death.67  Thus, the 1988 legislation permitted the non-institutionalized spouse to 
retain both income and assets (resources) rather than use them to pay for the 
institutionalized spouse’s long-term care.68  The goal of the legislation was to 
recognize the ownership rights of the non-institutionalized spouse in a 
significant portion of the community assets, exempting income and resources 
from attachment to pay for the institutionalized spouse’s care.69  Nonetheless, 
since the MCCA’s enactment, litigation of the details continues, resulting in 
additional legislation.70 
B.  Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 
To address some of the issues developing after the 1988 legislation, Congress 
enacted the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA). 71  
                                                             
 62. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(1)(B)‒(C), (b)(2). 
 63. Id. § 1396r-5(d)(2), (6).  See also supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 64. Nursing Home Medicaid Coverage—Basic Financial Eligibility Rules About Income, 
Resources, and Spousal Protections, N.Y. LEGAL ASSISTANCE GRP. (Aug. 26, 2014), http://www. 
wnylc.com/health/pdf/96/. 
 65. Robyn O’Neill & Lee Beneze, A Guide to Medicaid’s Spousal Impoverishment Rules, 84 
ILL. B.J. 22, 23 (1996). 
 66. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(c)(1)(B). 
 67. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., POLICY BRIEF #3, supra note 19, at 10. 
 68. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(c)(4). 
 69. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
 70. See, e.g., Wis. Dep’t of Health & Family Servs. v. Blumer, 534 U.S. 473, 492‒94 (2002) 
(holding that income of the institutionalized spouse must first be given to the non-institutionalized 
spouse to meet the minimum monthly maintenance needs allowance); Wojchowski v. Daines, 498 
F.3d 99, 109‒10 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that Social Security payable to the institutionalized spouse 
must first be applied to the non-institutionalized spouse); Burinskas v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 691 
A.2d 586, 591‒92 (Conn. 1997) (holding that certain expenses incurred for home care may not be 
covered by the monthly maintenance needs allowance). 
 71. See generally Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 
312.  See also Ira Stewart Wiesner, Obra ‘93 and Medicaid: Asset Transfers, Trust Availability, 
38 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 65:27 
Specifically, the 1993 legislation provided for the following: (1) recovery could 
be taken from a recipient at age fifty-five rather than sixty-five; (2) states were 
now obligated to recover assets to the extent of expenditures made for a qualified 
recipient; (3) a definition of “estate” was added, similar to what appears in the 
current legislation; and (4) recovery may be initiated only after the surviving 
recipient’s spouse’s death, but there was no definition of what constitutes the 
estate of the surviving spouse.72 
In summary, the 1993 legislation extended the “look-back” period during 
which any transfer of assets may adversely affect eligibility for Medicaid long-
term care benefits; the period was extended to thirty-six months.73  In addition, 
the legislation removed any cap on the penalty period if a transfer is made during 
the transfer period, and mandated added scrutiny requirements for any trust 
established by applicants and their spouses.74  Additionally, if a transfer is made 
by the institutionalized spouse or the non-institutionalized spouse, it is possible 
to trace any of these assets through either party to succeeding holders of the 
assets.75  Overall, the 1993 legislation sought to curb some of the advantages 
provided in the MCCA,76 but the revisions of 1993 were nothing compared to 
legislation enacted by Congress in 2005.77 
                                                             
and Estate Recovery Statutory Analysis in Context, 19 NOVA L. REV. 679, 682‒83 (1995) (noting 
that there existed a perception in Congress that “well-to-do elders, through artifice and scheme, 
were obtaining public payment of their nursing home care while preserving their financial security 
and their ability to transmit wealth to younger generations,” and that this perception “was 
crystallized by concerns raised primarily from the state Medicaid agencies and from the long-term 
care insurance industry”). 
 72. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(1)(B)‒(C), (2), (4). 
 73. Id. § 1396p(c)(1)(B)(i). 
 74. See William H. Overman & William A. McCormick, The SSI Anti-Fraud Provisions of 
FCIA 99: Welfare Reform Continues, 13-WTR NAELA Q. 3, 3 (2000); Joel A. Mendler, Using 
Trusts for Disabled Clients: Preserving Governmental Benefits, 44 LA. B.J. 26, 27 (1996).  See, 
e.g., Bucholtz v. Belshe, 114 F.3d 923, 926 (9th Cir. 1997).  The case held that the California estate 
recovery program was unable to reach the assets of an inter vivos trust pertaining to a decedent who 
died prior to 1993; the trust was not part of what was termed the estate, because 
a decedent’s property interests in revocable inter vivos trusts end at his death, and the 
property vests in accordance with the trust terms alone, just as a decedent’s property 
interests held in joint tenancy end at his death, and the property vests in accordance with 
the terms of the joint tenancy provisions alone. 
Id.  But see Bonta v. Burke, 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d 72, 77 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (finding that the state 
could recover from any assets in which the decedent Medicaid recipient held a remainder interest 
in real property); In re Estate of Thompson, 586 N.W.2d 847, 851 (N.D. 1998) (holding that the 
state could recover from the estate of the non-institutionalized spouse upon death of the 
institutionalized spouse when assets were held at death through an inter vivos trust). 
 75. See, e.g., In re Estate of Bergman, 688 N.W.2d 187, 191‒92 (N.D. 2004) (permitting 
tracing to access a Medicaid recipient’s property passed to his wife who transferred it to her son). 
 76. See supra note 71‒75 and accompanying text.  
 77. See infra Part I.C. 
2015] Selective Issues in Effective Medicaid Estate Recovery Statutes 39 
C.  Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 
The DRA contained the most significant changes to Medicaid eligibility 
rules.78  Like the 1993 legislation, the DRA provided even more restrictions to 
transfers of homes, creations of annuities, and satisfaction of the MMMNA, and 
extended the “look-back” period to sixty months from thirty-six.79  Specifically, 
the changes initiated by the 2005 legislation were the following: (1) transfers by 
spouses or applicants would be counted if made within five years (sixty months) 
of applying for benefits; (2) penalties imposed by transfers were shifted from the 
date of the actual transfer to the later date on which the Medicaid applicant 
would have been eligible but for the transfer penalty; (3) any annuities purchased 
must name the state as the remainder beneficiary, and the annuities must be 
irrevocable and nonassignable;80 (4) purchases of life estates in another person’s 
home loan repayments are scrutinized more closely; (5) exempt home equity 
value assigned to a community spouse, a minor child, or a disabled child is 
limited to a fixed amount indexed to inflation; and (6) establishing citizenship 
and hence entitlement to benefits will be more closely scrutinized.81 
Restrictions provided for the recovery of assets to pay for institutional care 
for spouses, specific classes of children, and in some instances, siblings or adult 
children.82   Applicable restraints include the following: (1) the state cannot 
recover from the recipient’s estate and cannot execute on a lien against the 
recipient’s residence during the life of the surviving spouse;83 and (2) if the non-
institutionalized spouse dies prior to the institutionalized spouse’s death, the 
state may not recover from spouse’s home if certain persons have lawfully lived 
in that home on a continuous basis since the institutionalized spouse entered into 
Medicaid long-term care.84  This includes children under the age of twenty-one, 
blind or disabled children, children over the age of twenty-one who have resided 
in the home for two years prior to the parent’s admission to an institution and 
who had provided care to that parent allowing the parent to remain in the home 
for as long as possible, and siblings who resided in the home at least one year 
prior to the institutionalization of the Medicaid recipient.85 
                                                             
 78. See generally Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4.  For a 
practitioner’s explanation of the legislation, see Bernard A. Krooks & Michael Gilfix, Navigating 
the System, 150 TRS. & ESTS. 39, 42 (2011).  See also Morris Klein, Medicaid Eligibility After the 
2005 Deficit Reduction Act, 41 MD. B.J. 32, 34 (2008) (“The DRA imposes more significant 
changes to the Medicaid program for long-term care than did previous laws.”). 
 79. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)(B)(i), (f)‒(g) (2012); id. § 1396r-5(d)(3)‒(6), (e)(2)(B)‒(C). 
 80. See Letter from Dennis G. Smith, supra note 36. 
 81. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(x)(1)‒(5); id. § 1396p(c)(1), (f)(1)‒(2). 
 82. Id. § 1396p(b)(1)‒(2). 
 83. Id. § 1396p(b)(2)(A)‒(B). 
 84. Id. 
 85. See id. 
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In spite of the DRA’s progressive requirements, extensive litigation has arisen 
concerning three specific issues.86  The first such issue is whether property in 
which a Medicaid recipient had an interest, but passed this interest to another via 
an “other arrangement,” may be subject to estate recovery.87  Traditionally, the 
term “estate” encompassed property passing under a last will and testament or 
through intestacy when there was no valid will.88  But increasingly, wealth 
transfer occurs through “other arrangements,” avoiding traditional estate 
capture.89  Federal law provides for this evolution in definition as an option, but 
state statutes have been slow to accommodate the more inclusive definition of 
estate. 90   The second issue is whether the state may recover from assets 
transferred prior to death by a Medicaid applicant or the applicant’s spouse.91  
Because these assets do not pass at the time of death of either spouse,92 are they 
“traceable” so as to be available to reimburse the state under estate recovery 
programs?  While the DRA contains language that seemingly decides this 
issue,93 state courts are divided, and each side offers cogent reasons for each 
dissimilar approach.94  The third issue is whether an annuity purchased to avoid 
disqualifying excess assets may nonetheless be considered a resource or a 
disqualifying transfer.95  The business of supplying annuities for spouses of 
recipients of long-term care has become significant.96  The DRA seemingly 
                                                             
 86. See infra notes 87, 91, 95 and accompanying text. 
 87. See 42 U.S.C. §1396p(b)(4)(A)‒(B).  See also, e.g., Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. 
McCormick, 283 P.3d 785, 791 (Idaho 2012). 
 88. See RAYMOND C. O’BRIEN & MICHAEL FLANNERY, DECEDENT’S ESTATES: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 5 (2d ed. 2011). 
 89. See, e.g., McCormick, 283 P.3d at 791. 
 90. See infra Part II.B; U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., POLICY BRIEF #1, supra 
note 21, at 5. 
 91. See, e.g., McCormick, 283 P.3d at 794 (citing In re Estate of Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d 882, 885 
(N.D. 2000)); In re Estate of Barg, 752 N.W.2d 52, 71 (Minn. 2008). 
 92. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B); infra note 232 and accompanying text. 
 93. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(A)‒(B) (“[T]he term ‘estate’ . . . may include, at the option 
of the State . . . , any other real and personal property and other assets in which the individual had 
any legal title or interest at the time of death . . . including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, 
or assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life 
estate, living trust, or other arrangement.”). 
 94. Compare McCormick, 283 P.3d at 794 (quoting Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d at 885) (arguing in 
favor of subjecting assets conveyed by the recipient to the recipient’s spouse before the recipient’s 
death and “traceable to the recipient’s estate . . . to the department’s recovery claim” while not 
necessarily including “all property ever held by either party during the marriage”); with Barg, 752 
N.W.2d at 71 (finding “no principled basis on which to interpret the federal law to allow recovery 
of assets in which the Medicaid recipient did not have an interest at the time of her death” and that 
“the language of the federal law clearly limits [the expanded definition of ‘estate’] to assets in 
which the recipient had an interest at the time of her death”). 
 95. See, e.g., Lopes v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 696 F.3d 180, 184 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 96. See generally Craig J. Langstraat, Lanitra Harris & James M. Plecnik, Annuity Strategy 
When Spouse Needs Nursing Home Coverage, 41 EST. PLANNING 25, 25 (2014) (discussing the use 
of annuities by spouses of long-term care recipients). 
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provides sufficient guidelines, but legal issues continue to arise.97  This Article 
thus takes each issue in turn. 
II.  FIRST ISSUE: DEFINING ESTATE 
A.  Exempt Marital Property 
Exemption of marital or community property permitted by successive federal 
laws created the need for estate recovery.98  By exempting the applicant spouse’s 
defined resources, assets, and income to prevent the impoverishment of the non-
institutionalized spouse, these monetary resources became temporarily 
unavailable for Medicaid expenditures.99  Estate recovery, eventually mandated 
by federal statute, is the attempt to recapture some or all of these assets not 
expended on Medicaid payments, and collection was to occur upon the death of 
both spouses.100  This process is illustrated by the OBRA.101  When Congress 
enacted legislation mandating that every state cooperate with federal law to 
provide Medicaid long-term care benefits, it correspondingly mandated a 
program to recover expenditures paid on behalf of any institutionalized 
Medicaid recipient.102  This program is known as “estate recovery,”103 and every 
state currently has a nominal statutory program to recover Medicaid 
expenditures made on behalf of an institutionalized person.104 
The goal of the estate recovery program is two-fold.  First, federal and state 
law recognizes that all assets acquired during marriage are community or marital 
assets earned from the joint efforts of both parties.105  Thus, if one of the parties 
requires long-term care, he or she may qualify for Medicaid as “poor” by 
exempting some of the marital assets as a recognition that the non-
institutionalized spouse earned those assets and should be entitled to their use.106  
                                                             
 97. See supra notes 86‒96 and accompanying text.  See also 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(A)‒(B) 
(defining the “estate” and its contents); id. § 1396r-5(c)(2) (providing for attribution of resources 
to spouses). 
 98. See supra Part I.A‒C.   
 99. See, e.g., Barg, 752 N.W.2d at 59 (“Medicaid thus balances the obligation of community 
spouses to contribute to the payment of medical expenses for their recipient spouses against the 
accommodation of the community spouse’s need to provide for his or her own support.”). 
 100. See Estate Recovery and Liens, MEDICAID.GOV, http://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid-
chip-program-information/by-topics/eligibility/estate-recovery.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2015).  
See also supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
 101. See supra Part I.B. 
 102. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
 103. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(1)(A) (2012) (“In the case of an individual described in subsection 
(a)(1)(B) of this section, the State shall seek adjustment or recovery from the individual’s estate or 
upon sale of the property subject to a lien imposed on account of medical assistance paid on behalf 
of the individual.”).  See id. § 1396p(b)(1)(B) (providing recovery provisions for persons fifty-five 
years of age or older at the time that such person obtained medical assistance). 
 104. See infra note 125 and accompanying text. 
 105. See infra Part IV.B; 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(b)(1). 
 106. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(c)(4). 
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But second, spouses have a duty to provide necessities for each other, and health 
care is a necessity.107  Therefore, upon both spouses’ death, there should be an 
“estate recovery” from exempted assets and income to pay for long-term care.108  
In essence, the state is seeking to recover Medicaid expenditures made on behalf 
of the institutionalized spouse from assets that were exempt because they 
provided a home (assets) or income to a non-institutionalized spouse.109  This 
process became codified as a result of federal legislation beginning in 1993, with 
certain rules becoming mandatory: (1) the age for recovery was lowered to fifty-
five; (2) the state could seek recovery from the recipient’s estate; (3) recovery 
of any expenditures are permitted only after the recipient’s surviving spouse’s 
death; and (4) the state has an option to enact a more inclusive definition of what 
constitutes an estate asset, such as when the decedent owned an interest that 
passes through nonprobate transfer, such as joint tenancy.110 
Exempt marital assets were never intended to be exempt in perpetuity.111  The 
ultimate intent of the estate recovery program is to subject the community assets 
generated by the two spouses to payment of any Medicaid expenditures; 
recovery is delayed until the surviving spouse’s death to permit the non-recipient 
spouse to use the exempt assets in an unfettered fashion.112  Sadly, upon the 
                                                             
 107. See Bartrom v. Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 618 N.E.2d 1, 8 (Ind. 1993) (“When . . . there is 
a shortfall between a dependent spouse’s necessary expenses and separate funds, the law will 
impose limited secondary liability upon the financially superior spouse by means of the doctrine of 
necessaries.”).  See also id. at 3‒4 (noting that the doctrine of necessaries in its various iterations 
has generally been extended to medical care). 
 108. See, e.g., In re Estate of Barg, 752 N.W.2d 52, 65 (Minn. 2008) (“The State may not seek 
recovery from the beneficiary’s estate until the death of the surviving spouse, if any, and only if the 
individual has no surviving minor or disabled child.”) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 103-11, at 208 
(1993)).  See also U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., POLICY BRIEF #4, MEDICAID LIENS 
3 (2005), http://aspe.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/74096/liens.pdf (“The objective [of estate 
recovery] was to recover taxpayer dollars invested in Medicaid by requiring more people to use 
private resources to defray the cost of their own long-term care.”). 
 109. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., POLICY BRIEF #4, supra note 108, at 3. 
 110. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(1), (4).  See, e.g., Barg, 752 N.W.2d at 61.  The court stated: 
For example, when two persons hold property in joint tenancy with a right of survivorship 
and one dies, the deceased joint tenant’s interest ordinarily passes directly to the 
surviving joint tenant and is not part of the probate estate.  Under the optional expanded 
definition allowed by federal law, for Medicaid recovery purposes the interest of a 
deceased joint tenant who had received Medicaid would be included in his estate, rather 
than passing directly to the surviving joint tenant. 
Id. 
 111. See In re Estate of Thompson, 586 N.W.2d 847, 850‒51 (N.D. 1998) (discussing the 
legislative purpose allowing for state recovery of Medicaid benefits from recipient’s estate 
following the surviving spouse’s death and the fact that “the relevant statutory provisions, in light 
of the Congressional purpose to provide medical care for the needy, reveals a legislative intention 
to allow states to trace the assets of recipients of medical assistance and recover the benefits paid 
when the recipient’s surviving spouse dies”). 
 112. See id.  See also Janel C. Frank, Note, How Far Is Too Far? Tracing Assets in Medicaid 
Estate Recovery, 79 N.D. L. REV. 111, 122, 129, 140 (2003) (noting the “dual interests” served by 
allowing the surviving spouses to retain assets while alive and permitting Medicaid to recover upon 
2015] Selective Issues in Effective Medicaid Estate Recovery Statutes 43 
death of both spouses, family members are distraught when they discover that 
what they thought was permanently exempt is now subject to recovery.  The 
media has taken notice of estate recovery, with one local newspaper painting a 
vivid picture of the process: “[the family] pictured the state as the villain in the 
black cape, like the villain in melodrama depicted on the silent movie screen, 
appearing on the doorstep to foreclose and leave the family on the street.”113 
Reflecting the fact that exempt assets were meant to safeguard the financial 
investment of spouses and the dependency of certain other persons, exempt 
assets may include the following: (1) the applicant’s home up to a certain value 
and subject to continuing residency of a spouse or a minor or disabled or 
caregiving child; (2) an automobile, regardless of value if it is used for 
transportation; (3) all of the community property within the home, regardless of 
value if there is a community spouse, but otherwise with value qualifications; 
(4) property used for trade or business and necessary for support; (5) tools of the 
applicant’s or spouse’s trade; (6) any life insurance policy up to a face value of 
$1,500; (7) burial plots for the applicant and for family members plus prepaid 
costs for burial; and (8) $1,500 for revocable funeral arrangements.114  These 
exempt assets and the corresponding federal statutes would seem to clarify any 
questions pertaining to estate recovery, but issues remain.115 
                                                             
their deaths); In re Estate of Craig, 624 N.E.2d 1003, 1006 (N.Y. 1993) (highlighting the 1993 
amendment to estate recovery provisions of federal law which allows states to recover against a 
recipient’s estate, but only those assets “conveyed through joint tenancy and other specified 
forms of survivorship”). 
 113. Sandra Reed, You Can’t Take It With You, But Can the State Take It From You?, GLEN 
ROSE RPTR. (Nov. 10, 2014, 11:31 AM), http://www.yourglenrosetx.com/opinion/columinsts/ 
article_f6fb9858-a3e3-55b4-9cf7-3db4289cd76f.html.  Across the country there are similar 
comments.  See, e.g., Beth Duffy, Estates Could Owe Medicaid, THE GAZETTE (Grand Cedar 
Rapids, Iowa) (Mar. 28, 2014, 8:23 PM), http://www.thegazette.com/2013/09/13/estates-could-
owe-medicaid (predicting that Medicaid expansion might cause a cycle of poverty); Carole Fader, 
Fact Check: What Happens When a Medicaid Recipient Dies?, FLA. TIMES-UNION (Jacksonville) 
(Mar. 29, 2014), http://jacksonville.com/reason/fact-check/2014-03-27/story/fact-check-what-
happens-when-medicaid-recipient-dies (noting that estates of the deceased may be responsible for 
paying back all Medicaid costs); Monica J. Franklin, Elder Law Update: Medicaid Estate Recovery 
in Tennessee, 48 TENN. B.J. 35, 36‒37 (2012) (explaining how estate recovery expansion may have 
negative consequences for the elderly); Katrina S. Jones & Marco D. Chayet, Resolving a Medicaid 
Claim in a Decedent’s Probate Estate, 37 COLO. LAW. 31, 32‒33, 36 (2008) (noting that states use 
liens to collect against all property not only probate estates); Shannon Mullen, Medicaid’s Death 
Bill Leaves Homes, Assets at Risk, ASBURY PARK PRESS (N.J.) (Feb. 16, 2014, 5:33 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/02/16/medicaid-death-bill-homes-assets-at-risk 
/5534575/; Craig Reaves, Paying for the “Institutionalized Spouse,” N.Y. TIMES: NEW OLD AGE 
BLOG (June 4, 2010, 9:00 AM), http://newoldage.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/06/04/paying-for-the-
instiutionalized-spouse (showing that through estate recovery, Medicaid will recoup expenses 
before heirs are able to receive inheritance). 
 114. 42 U.S.C. § 1382b(a), (d). 
 115. See supra notes 93, 114 and accompanying text. 
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B.  Constituting the Estate 
Determining the parameters of the estate and then the process of estate 
recovery begins with the long-term care recipient’s death.  The state may require 
the personal representative of the recipient’s estate to notify the state so the state 
can assess whether estate recovery is appropriate. 116   What constitutes a 
recipient’s estate must include first, “all real and personal property and other 
assets included within the individual’s estate, as defined for purposes of State 
probate law.”117  These assets constitute the minimum and they may be limited 
depending on the state’s probate statute.118  But there is a second segment to the 
federal legislation: federal law permits states to exercise an option to expand the 
definition of estate to include other assets owned at death but passing outside of 
traditional probate. 119   These would include joint tenancy, survivorship 
provisions, life estates, living trusts, and other arrangements.120  Modern forms 
of wealth transfer pass a great deal of wealth through these mechanisms, and 
they are incorporated into this optional portion of the federal statute.121 
Specifically, the optional portion of the federal legislation expands assets 
beyond the range of traditional forms of probate,122 providing: 
                                                             
 116. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 215 (West 2015).  The statute states: 
Where a deceased person has received or may have received health care under Chapter 7 
(commencing with Section 14000) or Chapter 8 (commencing with Section 14200) of 
Part 3 of Division 9 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, or was the surviving spouse of 
a person who received that health care, the estate attorney, or if there is no estate attorney, 
the beneficiary, the personal representative, or the person in possession of property of the 
decedent shall give the Director of Health Care Services notice of the decedent’s death 
not later than 90 days after the date of death.  The notice shall include a copy of the 
decedent’s death certificate.  The notice shall be given as provided in Section 1215, 
addressed to the director at the Sacramento office of the director. 
Id.  See also MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-13-317 (West 2015); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 50-24.1-07(3) 
(West 2015). 
 117. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(A). 
 118. See id.; see, e.g., In re Estate of Jones, 280 S.W.2d 647, 651 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) (noting 
that the federal statute represents the minimum assets included in the estate); Hines v. Dep’t of Pub. 
Aid, 831 N.E.2d 641, 645 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (noting that the state probate statute did consider a 
decedent’s automobile to be part of the estate). 
 119. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B). 
 120. Id. 
 121. See John H. Langbein, Major Reforms of the Property Restatement and the Uniform 
Probate Code: Reformation, Harmless Error, and Nonprobate Transfers, 38 ACTEC L.J. 1, 10 
(2012) (“The deepest trend now affecting the day-to-day reality of gratuitous transfers in the United 
States is the nonprobate revolution, by which I mean the burgeoning use of will substitutes to 
transfer property on death.”). 
 122. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 41 (9th 
ed. 2013) (“Probate property is property that passes through probate under the decedent’s will . . . 
or by intestacy . . . .  Nonprobate property is property that passes outside of probate by way of a 
will substitute . . . .”).  Examples of nonprobate transfers are inter vivos trusts, life insurance, joint 
tenancies, and payable on death contracts.  Id. at 42. 
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[A recipient’s estate] may include, at the option of the State (and shall 
include, in the case of an individual to whom paragraph (1)(C)(i) 
applies), any other real and personal property and other assets in which 
the individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death (to the 
extent of such interest), including such assets conveyed to a survivor, 
heir, or assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, 
tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other 
arrangement.123 
Assets are further defined as including income and resources of the individual 
and the individual’s spouse, including any “income or resources [to] which the 
individual or such individual’s spouse is entitled.”124  Because states may define 
the probate estate in a manner that does not exceed federal guidelines, state 
statutes vary on what is included.125  Some state statutes are expansive in scope, 
some are restrictive, and some specifically exclude assets from the probate 
estate. 126   Federal preemption is rare, and states may exercise initiative; 
                                                             
 123. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B).  An individual taking under paragraph (1)(C)(i) is someone 
“who has received (or is entitled to receive) benefits under a long-term care insurance policy in 
connection with which assets or resources are disregarded.”  Id. § 1396p(b)(1)(C)(i). 
 124. Id. § 1396p(h)(1). 
 125. See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 47.07.055 (West 2015); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2935 
(2015); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-76-436 (West 2015); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 14009.5 (West 
2015); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25.5-4-302 (West 2015); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17b-93 
(West 2015); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, §§ 5001, 5003 (West 2015); D.C. MUN. REGS. tit 29, §§ 
6700‒6702 (LexisNexis 2015); FLA. STAT. § 409.9101 (West 2015); GA. CODE ANN. § 49-4-147.1 
(West 2015); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 346-37 (West 2015); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 56-218 (West 
2015); 305 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/5-13 (West 2015); IND. CODE ANN. § 12-15-9-0.5 (West 
2015); IOWA CODE ANN. § 249A.53 (West 2015); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 39-709 (West 2015); KY. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 205.624 (West 2015); LA. STAT. ANN. § 46:153 (2014); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 22, § 14 (West 2015); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 118E, § 31 (West 2015); MICH. COMP. LAWS 
ANN. §§ 400.112g, 400.112h, 400.112i, 400.112k (West 2015); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 256B.15 
(West 2015); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 43-13-317 (West 2015); MO. ANN. STAT. § 473.398 (West 
2015); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-6-167 (West 2015); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 68-919 (West 2015); 
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 422.29302 (West 2015); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 167:13, 167:14 (West 
2015); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4D-7.2 (West 2015); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 27-2A-4 (West 2015); N.Y. 
SOC. SERV. LAW § 369 (McKinney 2015); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 108A-70.5 (West 2015); N.D. 
CENT. CODE ANN. § 50-24.1-07 (West 2015); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5162.21, 5162.211–.212 
(West 2015); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 5051.3 (West 2015); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.795 
(West 2015); 62 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1412 (West 2015); 40 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. 
§ 40-8-15 (West 2015); S.C. CODE ANN. § 43-7-460 (2015); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 28-6-23 to 
23.1 (West 2015); TENN. CODE ANN. § 71-5-116 (West 2015); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-19-13.5 
(West 2015); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, §§ 122, 2113 (West 2015); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 32.1-326.1, 
32.1-327 (West 2015); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.20B.080 (West 2015); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 
9-5-11c (West 2015); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 49.496, 49.682 (West 2015); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 42-4-
206 (West 2015). 
 126. See, e.g., Estate of Darby v. Stinson, 68 So. 3d 702, 706, 708 (Miss. Ct. App. 2011) 
(holding that the state’s homestead exemption statute excluded a portion of the decedent’s estate 
from probate and the estate recovery program).  The court noted that “some states have incorporated 
a broad definition of estate for Medicaid expense recovery programs.”  Id. at 705.  See MISS CODE 
ANN. § 85-3-21 (West 2015) (specifically exempting certain land and buildings up to a certain size 
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however, states must comply with federal law when defining assets, what 
constitutes probate, and when and to what extent payment is to be made to 
individuals.127  Without a federal mandate, it is difficult to conceive of national 
uniformity for estate recovery programs.128 
Some states permit singular examples of nonprobate transfers, such as 
recovery from real property held by a married couple under tenancy by the 
entirety.129  But strict construction permits this transfer to be included only when 
the state probate statute specifically incorporates this transfer in the probate 
estate.130  Other states incorporate language of the federal Medicaid statute,131 
but many states ignore the opportunity to define the estate in a truly inclusive 
fashion.132  An inclusive statute would contain an expanded definition of the 
probate estate to include all forms of nonprobate transfers, including those listed 
in federal legislation, such as joint tenancies, living trusts, and payable on death 
                                                             
and value under a homestead exemption).  But other state statutes have used the expanded federal 
option and included transfers not within traditional probate.  See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 
249A.53(2)(b) (West 2015) (including the entirety of both a beneficiary’s and his or her spouse’s 
estates); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 14.2-1(F)(2) (West 2015) (permitting living trusts); MO. 
ANN. STAT. § 473.398(6) (West 2015) (allowing life insurance proceeds). 
 127. 42 U.S.C. §1396a(a)(18); In re Jones, 280 S.W.3d 647, 650 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009).  For a 
discussion of federal preemption of state law, see Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. McCormick, 
283 P.3d 785, 794‒95 (Idaho 2012) (holding that federal law did not preempt the state’s ability to 
recover from the estate what was once a Medicaid recipient’s community property). 
 128. See supra note 125 and accompanying text (demonstrating the variety of state recovery 
statutes). 
 129. See In re Estate of Bruce, 260 S.W.3d 398, 400, 402‒03 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008) (noting that 
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) “empowers Missouri to define ‘estate’ broadly and thereby to pursue 
property that a recipient owned jointly with another individual when the recipient died but that 
would not be included in the decedent’s estate,” where the decedent had owned a home with his 
wife as a tenancy by the entirety). 
 130. See, e.g., id. at 402‒03. 
 131. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 56-218(4) (West 2015).  The statute provides: 
For purposes of this section, the term “estate” shall include: (a) All real and personal 
property and other assets included within the individual’s estate, as defined for purposes 
of state probate law; and (b) Any other real and personal property and other assets in 
which the individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death, to the extent of 
such interest, including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased 
individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living 
trust or other arrangement. 
Id.  See also 305 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-13 § 5-13 (West 2015) (including claims against estate 
of recipients); IND. CODE ANN. § 12-15-9-0.5(a)(1)‒(4) (West 2015); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, 
§ 14.2(2-1)(F)(1)‒(2) (2015). 
 132. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., POLICY BRIEF #1, supra note 21, at 5 
(“[E]vidence is lacking on what types of assets are included under the broad definition of estate in 
those states that have elected to extend their recovery efforts beyond the probate estate.  One study 
determined that 20 of 40 responding states using the Federal minimum definition, while the 
remaining 24 states used some variation of the broader option.  A later study reported that 30 of 48 
responding states used the minimum definition.”). 
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certificates and contracts.133   It would also permit tracing the assets at the 
surviving spouse’s death.134  But federal law does not require this expanded 
definition; federal law requires only that the state’s definition of estate include 
“all real and personal property and other assets included within the individual’s 
estate, as defined for purposes of State probate law.”135  If the state does not use 
the precise language of the federal statute in its probate law, then there is a risk 
that some nonprobate transfers will not be available to the state recovery 
program.136  Thus, because of state variations in defining what constitutes the 
estate, there is an elusive aspect to estate recovery. 
Disparity among the states in collecting under estate recovery programs likely 
results from the large federal subsidy provided for Medicaid, the complexity of 
the subject area, and the nascent possibility of any recovery at all.137  Often state 
statutes have not embraced modern forms of wealth transfer at death, and the 
parameters of what constitutes the estates are vague.138  In spite of the fact that 
federal law permits a broader description of what is included in probate, the 
states have been slow to adopt more expansive language.139  The cost of failure 
to recover estate assets can be high for both federal and state agencies, and 
                                                             
 133. See In re Estate of Thompson, 586 N.W.2d 847, 850 (N.D. 1998) (giving an example of 
an expansive definition of the estate). 
 134. See infra Part III (discussing the tracing of transferred assets). 
 135. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(A) (2012).  Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) 
instructs the state to specify what is included in the definition of estate.  See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH 
& HUMAN SERVS., CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., THE STATE MEDICAID MANUAL § 
3810 (2001), http://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Guidance/Manuals/Paper-Based-
Manuals-Items/CMS021927.html?DLPage=1&DLSort=0&DLSortDir=ascending. 
 136. See supra notes 130‒32 and accompanying text. 
 137. For a discussion of the disparity among states and the type of issues that cause the 
differences, see U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., POLICY BRIEF #1, supra note 21, at 1‒
2, 8 (noting that only twelve states had recovery programs before 1990, that Medicaid is the “largest 
source of funds for institutional long-term care expenses,” and that there are “complex tax 
implications” involved). 
 138. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 118E, § 31(c) (West 2015) (“For purposes of this 
section, ‘estate’ shall mean all real and personal property and other assets includable in the 
decedent’s probate estate under the General Laws.”); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 400.112h(a) (West 
2015).  The Michigan provision states: 
“Estate” means all property and other assets included within an individual’s estate that is 
subject to probate administration under article III of the estates and protected individuals 
code, [MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.] 700.3101 to 700.3988, except assets otherwise subject 
to claims under section 3805(3) of the estates and protected individuals code, [MICH. 
COMP. LAWS ANN.] 700.3805, are not part of the estate. 
Id.  For a discussion of state hesitancy to accommodate nonprobate transfers in modern statutes, 
see Raymond C. O’Brien, Integrating Marital Property Into a Spouse’s Elective Share, 59 CATH. 
U. L. REV. 617, 638 (2010). 
 139. See supra note 132 and accompanying text; U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
POLICY BRIEF #1, supra note 21, at 5. 
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failure to collect frustrates congressional intent as recited in the OBRA and most 
recently the DRA.140 
An illustration of a state statutory deficiency occurred in In re Estate of 
Jones.141  The facts included a Medicaid recipient who died at the age of ninety-
two owing the state $22,226.24 in Medicaid long-term care benefits that were 
paid on his behalf.142  At his death, his only asset—his home—passed to his 
children via a beneficiary deed, a nonprobate transfer device not traditionally 
associated with transfer through probate.143  The home was valued at $24,000 
and would have been sufficient to reimburse the state for its Medicaid 
expenditures, but the decedent’s children argued that “because the State has not 
amended the definition of ‘estate’ [in its code] to include nonprobate transfers, 
the State cannot recover its Medicaid benefits from a nonprobate transfer.”144  
At the time, the Missouri probate code defined the term estate as including “the 
real and personal property of the decedent or ward, as from time to time changed 
in form by sale, reinvestment or otherwise, and augmented by any accretions 
and additions thereto and substitutions therefor, and diminished by any deceases 
and distributions therefrom.”145  The beneficiary deed used by the decedent to 
transfer the home to his children was an effective nonprobate transfer device,146 
prompting the question as to whether this form of transfer could be included in 
the state’s definition of estate.147 
The Missouri Court of Appeals framed the issue as not involving whether the 
transfer could be included in the state definition of estate, but rather whether the 
state’s estate recovery statutes allowed the state to proceed as a creditor.148  This 
issue depends on the construction of another state statute specifying that: “Each 
recipient of a recoverable transfer of a decedent’s property shall be liable to 
account for a pro rata share of the value of all such property received, to the 
                                                             
 140. Cases often refer to the purpose of Congress to recover Medicaid expenditures.  See, e.g., 
Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. McCormick, 283 P.3d 785, 788 (Idaho 2012) (stating that 
“Medicaid has always been intended to be the ‘payer of last resort’”); In re Estate of Barg, 752 
N.W.2d 52, 58‒60 (Minn. 2008) (discussing the congressional intent behind Medicaid and the 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act); In re Estate of Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d 882, 885‒86 (N.D. 2000) 
(finding that Congress “revealed an intent to allow states a wide latitude in seeking Medicaid benefit 
recoveries”). 
 141. 280 S.W.3d 647 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009). 
 142. Id. at 649‒50 
 143. Id. at 649, 651; Susan N. Gary, Transfer-on-Death Deeds: The Nonprobate Revolution 
Continues, 41 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 529, 532 (2006) (noting that “[a] transfer-on-death deed 
or TOD deed, also known as a beneficiary deed, allows the owner of real property to execute a deed 
that names the beneficiary who will succeed to ownership at the owner’s death” and that “if the 
owner records the deed and does not revoke it, the beneficiary will be able to obtain title to the 
property at the owner’s death without going through probate”) (footnote omitted). 
 144. Jones, 280 S.W.3d at 650. 
 145. Id. at 651; MO. ANN. STAT. § 472.010(11) (West 2015). 
 146. Jones, 280 S.W.3d at 651. 
 147. Id. at 651‒52. 
 148. Id. 
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extent necessary to discharge . . . claims remaining unpaid after application of 
the decedent’s estate . . . .”149  Recoverable transfer is defined as “a nonprobate 
transfer of a decedent’s property under sections 461.003 to 461.081.” 150  
Therefore, the court held that the state was a creditor and may bring an action 
for recovery of the money owed, even though the home was transferred through 
a beneficiary deed, a nonprobate transfer.151 
Although the state was allowed to recover for long-term care benefits,152 the 
case illustrates the failure of the state’s statute and the difficulty of recovery.153  
This problem resulted from the fact that the estate recovery statute did not 
include the array of nonprobate transfers commonly used to transfer property at 
death—all of which are listed as permissible for the state to use.154  Instead, 
recovery occurred because the state was a creditor and, as such, could seek 
restitution for monetary contribution from nonprobate assets if the probate estate 
was insufficient.155  The case illustrates the issue of whether the state’s estate 
recovery statute is broad enough to encompass the transfer of an asset at the 
death of the recipient or of his or her spouse.156  Some state courts have accepted 
the challenge by interpreting state statutes broadly.157  Other states have not been 
willing to adopt an expansive definition.158   These different approaches are 
illustrated in the following material. 
1.  Expansive Statutory Construction 
An expansive approach towards estate recovery is illustrated in the Supreme 
Court of North Dakota’s decision in In re Estate of Thompson.159  The facts are 
typical of an estate recovery case; a married couple obtained long-term care 
Medicaid benefits for one spouse, and the other received exempt assets or 
                                                             
 149. Id. at 652 (citing MO. ANN. STAT. § 461.300.1 (West 2015)). 
 150. Id. (citing MO. ANN. STAT. § 461.300.10(4)). 
 151. Id. at 655. 
 152. See id. at 655‒56. 
 153. See id. at 651 (commenting that “the State admits that Missouri has not expanded the 
definition of ‘estate’ to include nonprobate transfers”). 
 154. Id. at 650‒51; 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B) (2012). 
 155. Id. at 654‒56.  For additional statutory liability whenever the probate estate is insufficient, 
see UNIF. PROB. CODE § 6-102 (amended 2010). 
 156. Jones, 280 S.W.3d at 650.  See also Hines v. Dep’t of Pub. Aid, 831 N.E.2d 641, 646 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 2005), aff’d, 850 N.E.2d 148 (Ill. 2006) (holding that an expansive reading of the statute 
is not warranted and is preempted by federal law). 
 157. See, e.g., Estate of Marusich v. State, 313 P.3d 1272, 1278, 1280‒81 (Wyo. 2013) 
(commenting on other courts’ approaches and applying an expanded definition of “estate”). 
 158. See, e.g., Hines, 831 N.E.2d at 645 (finding that “[the decedent’s] interest in [a] home and 
[an] automobile would not be included in his ‘estate’ [under state law]”); In re Estate of Darby, 68 
So. 3d 702, 705‒06 (Miss. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that states have the ability to adopt a broader 
definition of estate). 
 159. 586 N.W.2d 847, 850 (N.D. 1998) (noting that the “‘plain meaning’ of the very broad 
definition of the recipient’s estate in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) must also be considered”). 
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income.160  The husband’s benefits totaled $58,237.30, provided between 1991 
and his death in 1992.161  He predeceased his wife, who died in 1995 with an 
estate of $46,507.98.162  Then, in accordance with state law, after the personal 
representative notified the state of the wife’s death, the state initiated a claim to 
recover the money spent on her husband’s care ($58,237.30) plus interest 
($9,356.79).163  Between the time of the death of the Medicaid recipient (the 
husband), but prior to the death of the recipient’s spouse (the wife), North 
Dakota adopted an estate recovery statute that was based on the federal expanded 
definition of what constitutes the probate estate.164  The federal statute provided 
the following: 
(4) For purposes of this subsection, the term “estate”, with respect to 
a deceased individual—(A) shall include all real and personal property 
and other assets included within the individual’s estate, as defined for 
purposes of State probate law; and (B) may include, at the option of 
the State . . . any other real and personal property and other assets in 
which the individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death 
(to the extent of such interest), including such assets conveyed to a 
survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual through joint 
tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or 
other arrangement.165 
The state filed a claim against the estate of the surviving spouse upon that 
spouse’s death under the state’s estate recovery statute,166  and the personal 
representative of the now-deceased surviving spouse refused payment.167  The 
personal representative argued that federal law prohibits the state from collecting 
for Medicaid benefits paid to a predeceasing recipient spouse from the estate of 
a surviving spouse.168  In other words, although it is possible to collect from the 
recipient spouse, the state is prohibited from collecting from the surviving 
                                                             
 160. Id. at 848‒49. 
 161. Id. at 848. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 849‒50. 
 165. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) (2012). 
 166. Thompson, 586 N.W.2d at 848.  At the time, N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-24.1-07(1)‒(2) 
provided: 
(1) On the death of any recipient of medical assistance who was fifty-five years of age or 
older when the recipient received the assistance, and on the death of the spouse of such 
a deceased recipient, the total amount of medical assistance paid on behalf of the recipient 
following the recipient’s fifty-fifth birthday must be allowed as a preferred claim against 
the decedent’s estate . . . (2) No claim must be paid during the lifetime of the decedent’s 
surviving spouse, if any . . . . 
Id. at 849 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 50-24.1-07(1)‒(2) (West 2015)). 
 167. Id. at 848, 850. 
 168. Id.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(1) (prohibiting recovery of medical assistance paid for an 
individual under the state Medicaid plan except under certain circumstances). 
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spouse.  In response to the personal representative, the state relied upon another 
section of the federal statute permitting the state to collect from the surviving 
spouse the value of medical assistance paid to the recipient after the non-
recipient surviving spouse’s death.169   However, the personal representative 
contended that even if the state were correct, the state’s recovery statute was not 
enacted until after the recipient spouse’s death in 1992. 170   The personal 
representative argued that the state statute could not be applied retroactively to 
collect from the non-recipient surviving spouse at her death in 1995.171 
The North Dakota Supreme Court held that a state estate recovery program 
could not collect from the estate of a decedent recipient of Medicaid long-term 
care during the lifetime of that recipient’s spouse.172  Nonetheless, the state 
could, upon that recipient’s spouse’s death, inquire how that surviving non-
recipient spouse acquired any assets from the recipient and then utilize the estate 
recovery statute to collect any amounts paid for long-term care.173  Furthermore, 
the state statute’s expanded definition of what constitutes the probate estate 
offers added elements that may be included in the recovery program at the 
surviving spouse’s death.174   The fact that the expanded definition of what 
constitutes the probate estate was not adopted until after the recipient spouse’s 
death was immaterial.175  The statute was in effect at the surviving spouse’s 
death.176  The practice contemplated by the state was valid since the state was 
simply collecting a debt that was due, not applying a statute retroactively.177 
By permitting the state statute to be applied against the estate of a Medicaid 
recipient who died prior to the enactment of the statute, the state court adopted 
                                                             
 169. Thompson, 586 N.W.2d at 850.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4).  See also Idaho Dep’t of 
Health & Welfare v. McCormick, 283 P.3d 785, 790‒91 (Idaho 2012) (holding that assets may 
include any property in which the Medicaid recipient spouse owns or holds an interest after October 
1, 1993); In re Estate of Craig, 624 N.E.2d 1003, 1006 (N.Y. 1993) (construing the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1993 to permit estate recovery programs against surviving non-recipient 
spouses). 
 170. Thompson, 586 N.W.2d at 851‒52. 
 171. Id.  The personal representative argued that the state was seeking an “inappropriate 
retroactive application of a statute.”  Id. at 852. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 850‒51. 
 174. Id. at 850 (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) as outlining the types of property 
recoverable under the state statute).  The court stated: 
That expansive definition is broad enough to encompass the department’s claim against 
the estate of a deceased spouse of a deceased recipient of medical assistance benefits for 
the amount of medical assistance paid out, to the extent the recipient at the time of death 
had any title or interest in assets which were conveyed to his or her spouse . . . . 
Id. 
 175. Id. at 852 (concluding that the state’s claim would not be an impermissible “retroactive” 
application of law because the duty to repay “arises upon receipt of the benefits”) (quoting In re 
Estate of Hooey, 521 N.W.2d 85, 87 (N.D. 1994)). 
 176. Id. at 849. 
 177. Id. at 852. 
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an expansive approach to estate recovery.178  The court implied that such a ruling 
is justified in light of the state’s policy of promoting “wide latitude in seeking 
estate recoveries.”179  The practice is also consistent with the policy of state 
collection upon both spouses’ death, one or both of whom collected long-term 
care benefits.180  Such a conclusion, a preference for an expansive state recovery 
approach, is shared by other courts.181  For example, the Supreme Court of 
Idaho, deciding whether the state’s estate recovery program was preempted by 
federal law, held that, “[i]n light of the ambiguously inclusive nature of 42 
U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B) and the plain definition of ‘assets’ in 42 U.S.C. § 
1396(h)(1), we cannot find that federal law preempts the State from providing 
for recovery of assets.”182  It appears that courts find an expansive approach to 
estate recovery based on the federal mandate that states engage in recovery, a 
preference for avoiding federal preemption, and overarching policy goals.183 
2.  Strict Statutory Construction 
Not every state agrees with the expansive approach taken by the North Dakota 
Supreme Court.  A notable example is the Illinois decision of Hines v. 
Department of Public Aid.184  The Appellate Court of Illinois held that federal 
Medicaid law did not permit estate recovery from the estate of the surviving 
spouse of a Medicaid recipient of long-term care. 185   The facts involved a 
husband who applied for and began receiving Medicaid long-term care 
assistance in 1994.186  At the time he began receiving benefits, he and his wife 
jointly owned a home and an automobile, and he received long-term care 
benefits until his death in 1997.187  The recipient’s spouse survived her husband 
                                                             
 178. Id. (holding that the decedent’s obligation to repay his benefits began at the time of the 
receipt, and that the statute is not retroactive when it draws upon facts antecedent to its passing); 
see also id. at 850 (determining that an expansive reading of the statute allowed the state to make 
a claim against the estate of a deceased person who was married to a benefit recipient). 
 179. Id. at 851. 
 180. See id. 
 181. See, e.g., Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. McCormick, 283 P.3d 785, 794‒95 (Idaho 
2012). 
 182. Id. at 794.  See also infra notes 236‒67 and accompanying text.  
 183. See id. at 794 (stating that the ambiguous nature of the federal statute prevents the court 
from “find[ing] that federal law preempts the State from providing for recovery of assets from both 
spouses’ estates”); Thompson, 586 N.W. 2d at 851 (highlighting congressional intent to allow states 
wide discretion in estate recovery). 
 184. 831 N.E.2d 641, 647 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (disagreeing with the “expanded definition” of 
“estate” in Thompson). 
 185. Id. (“Because federal law does not provide an exception to the general rule prohibiting 
recovery of medical assistance payments that would permit recovery from the estate of the 
surviving spouse of a recipient, Illinois law to the contrary exceeds the authority granted under the 
federal statute.”). 
 186. Id. at 642. 
 187. Id. 
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for four years but died in 2001.188  At the time of her death she still owned the 
home and the automobile, but both were sold following her death, with the home 
selling for $69,641.89 and the automobile for $2,000.189  Upon her death the 
state sought to recover $61,154.48, the cost of long-term care for her husband, 
from her estate.190  The issue then arose as to whether the state could recover 
from the non-recipient spouse’s estate for benefits paid on behalf of the recipient 
spouse, or whether the claim was barred by the federal Medicaid statute.191 
The Illinois Circuit Court held that the state recovery program was not 
preempted by the federal statute.192  Federal law permits states to include in the 
estate of a deceased recipient “any other real and personal property and other 
assets in which the individual had any legal title or interest at the time of 
death.”193  In this particular case, the non-recipient spouse inherited the house 
through a joint tenancy nonprobate transfer.194  This is permitted under Illinois 
law.195  The attorneys for the estate of the non-recipient spouse countered that 
the expanded definition of what constitutes the estate only applies when the 
decedent recipient spouse benefitted from state-sponsored long-term care 
insurance. 196   The Illinois Circuit Court disagreed, holding that the statute 
permitted estate recovery against assets which are part of the Illinois Probate 
Estate of the Medicaid recipient, not only a recipient receiving state-sponsored 
long-term care insurance.197 
The estate of the non-recipient spouse appealed the decision of the Illinois 
Circuit Court to the state’s appellate court.198  The appellate court held that the 
state statute permits claims to be brought against any inpatient in a nursing 
facility, the estate of such person, or the spouse of that person, but only upon the 
death of that person’s spouse.199  Additionally, when determining the estate of 
the surviving spouse the court began by acknowledging that federal law specifies 
                                                             
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. at 643. 
 193. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B) (2012)). 
 194. Id. at 642‒43. 
 195. See 305 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-13 (West 2015).  The Illinois statute is based on the 
federal statute.  Compare id. (“‘[E]state’ also includes any other real and personal property and 
other assets in which the deceased person had any legal title or interest at time of his or her death . 
. . including assets conveyed to a survivor . . . through joint tenancy . . . .”), with 42 U.S.C. § 13 
1396p(b)(4)(B) (“[A]ny other real and personal property and other assets in which the individual 
had any legal title or interest at the time of death . . . including such assets conveyed to a survivor . 
. . through joint tenancy . . . .”). 
 196. Hines, 831 N.E.2d at 643 (noting that the broad definition of an estate may be used for 
other situations, but is only required for recipients of state-sponsored long-term care insurance). 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. at 642. 
 199. Id. at 644 (citing 305 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-13 (West 2015)). 
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that states “may utilize the broad definition of the Medicaid recipient’s ‘estate’ . 
. . but they are only required to apply that definition when the recipient benefitted 
from . . . long-term care insurance coverage.”200  The appellate court noted that 
the Illinois state statute defines the term “estate” in two different ways,201 with 
both methods permitting a claim against the estate of a spouse of a Medicaid 
recipient upon that surviving spouse’s death.202  The first way an estate may be 
defined is to include “all real and personal property and other assets included 
within the person’s estate, as that term is used in the Probate Act of 1975.”203  
The second way provides an expanded definition of estate, consistent with the 
federal provision.204  But, unlike the federal statute, the state statute provides the 
following restrictive phrase: 
[H]owever, in the case of a deceased person who has received (or is 
entitled to receive) benefits under a long-term care insurance policy . 
. . ‘estate’ also includes any other real and personal property and 
other assets in which the deceased person had any legal title or 
interest at the time of his or her death.205 
The state statute, unlike its federal counterpart, included a provision that 
appeared to condition the expanded definition of estate to those receiving long-
term care insurance.206  Because the Medicaid recipient did not receive long-
term care insurance, his estate at the time of his death must be defined by the 
first, more limited definition of the term “estate.”207  Because the home and 
automobile did not pass to the surviving spouse under the more restrictive 
version of the state statute, the property was beyond the reach of the state’s estate 
recovery program.208  Put simply, the recipient’s estate under the Probate Act of 
1975 did not include his home and automobile at the time of his death, and while 
the more expansive definition would include these items, the statute’s broader 
definition of estate was inapplicable because the recipient did not receive long-
term care insurance as stipulated by the statute.209 
                                                             
 200. Id. at 643.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) (permitting states a definition of estate that 
exceeds what is typically included in the probate estate). 
 201. Hines, 831 N.E.2d at 645. 
 202. Id. at 644 (citing 305 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/5-13 (West 2015)). 
 203. Id. (quoting 305 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/5-13).  This portion of the state statute mirrors 
the federal code provision.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(A). 
 204. Hines, 831 N.E.2d at 644‒45 (emphasizing that the language in the state statute allows a 
broad definition of estate that is also found in the federal statute).  See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B). 
 205. Hines, 831 N.E.2d at 644 (quoting 305 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-13). 
 206. Compare 305 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/5-13 (using the word “however” to limit the 
expanded definition of “estate”), with 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B) (providing that no limitation on 
how “estate” can be defined within the confines of the statutory language). 
 207. Hines, 831 N.E.2d at 645. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. (“Julius’s interest in the home and automobile would not be included in his ‘estate’ 
under the Probate Act.  Those interests would be part of his more expansively defined estate, but 
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Thwarted in its pursuit of the home and automobile through the state’s 
expanded definition of estate, the Department of Public Aid then argued that the 
manner by which the surviving spouse obtained the property from the recipient 
spouse did not matter.210  The state argued: “[B]ecause a claim against the 
probate estate of the surviving spouse is permitted, it does not need to rely on 
the broad definition of ‘estate’ to reach the property in the [spouse’s] estate.”211  
But the appellate court disagreed, holding that recovery may be taken from the 
recipient spouse’s estate at the surviving spouse’s death.212  This recovery is 
limited to what the surviving spouse inherited from the estate of the recipient 
spouse.213  Thus, since the Illinois statute defines the estate of the recipient in a 
very narrow fashion, thereby excluding the home and automobile from passing 
through the recipient spouse’s probate, these items are not now available to the 
state estate recovery program from the estate of the non-recipient surviving 
spouse.214  The problem results from the Illinois statute: the surviving spouse 
did not receive the home and automobile in such a way as to make them available 
to the state’s estate recovery program.215  Moreover, any efforts on behalf of the 
state to attach these assets, the house, or the automobile, were prohibited by 
federal preemption.216 
The appellate court rejected the state’s argument that the state definition of 
“estate” and the entire estate recovery program should be viewed more 
expansively, thereby ignoring the limitation imposed by the word “however.”217  
                                                             
those cannot be reached by the Department because Julius does not fall within the second 
situation.”). 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. (“Recovery from the estate of a surviving spouse is, in fact, prohibited by federal 
law.”). 
 213. Id. (agreeing that the petitioner was correct in the argument that “federal law limits the 
State’s recovery to the estate of the individual Medicaid recipient”). 
 214. Id. (noting that the recipient did not fall under the more “expansive” definition, that his 
“estate” would be limited to his “probate estate,” and because, as the petitioner argued, the state 
could only recover from the Medicaid recipient’s estate per federal law, and not from the surviving 
spouse’s estate).  The court noted: 
A plain reading of the statute discloses a blanket prohibition against states’ recovery of 
medical assistance benefits, except in the three specified situations, and because that 
initial prohibition is not lifted by an express authorization to recover medical assistance 
benefits from the estate of a surviving spouse, Illinois law allowing just such a recovery 
exceeds the authority granted states under the federal law. 
Id. at 646. 
 215. Id. at 645 (discussing how the state statute’s “however” clause “implie[d] a distinction or 
limitation” with regard to the definition of “estate”). 
 216. At least one state has ruled that “[t]he preemption of state law is not to be readily inferred.”  
In re Estate of Mundell, 857 P.2d 631, 632 (Idaho 1993). 
 217. Hines, 831 N.E.2d at 645 (“The use of [the word] ‘however’ . . . implies a distinction . . . 
[and n]othing in the record indicates [the recipient] received or was entitled to benefits under a 
long-term-care insurance policy . . . [and his] ‘estate’ . . . would be limited to real and personal 
property included within his probate estate; which, in this case, was none.”). 
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It is understandable that courts preferring a more expansive approach to estate 
recovery permit this so as to “[further] the broad pu[r]pose of providing for the 
medical care of the needy,” acknowledging that “the greater amount recovered 
by the state allows the state to have more funds to provide future services.”218  
But the Illinois appellate court rejected any attempt to expand the terms of the 
estate recovery program statute219 and held that the appropriate remedy is to 
address the terms of the state statute that confined the expanded definition of 
estate to those Medicaid recipients receiving long-term care insurance.220 
Defining the estate in a manner to include both probate and nonprobate assets 
is one task; another is to permit assets that have been transferred inter vivos to 
any third party to become available for estate recovery.  States grapple with 
whether property may be traced to the ownership of a Medicaid recipient and his 
or her spouse through a bona fide transfer during the lifetime of either.221  This 
is the issue in the following material. 
III.  SECOND ISSUE: TRACING TRANSFERRED ASSETS 
As has been recited in the preceding cases, federal law permits states to define 
an estate in the traditional manner, under Part A of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4), as 
including “all real and personal property and other assets included within the 
individual’s estate, as defined for purposes of State probate law.”222  But then, 
Part B of the provision permits a state, at its own option, to permit recovery from 
any 
real and personal property and other assets in which the individual had 
any legal title or interest at the time of death (to the extent of such 
interest), including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign 
of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, 
survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement.223 
Both sections of the federal legislation imply transfers occurring at death, but 
the federal statute does not specifically encompass the situation involving 
spouses when the institutionalized Medicaid recipient spouse transfers property 
during his or her life to the non-recipient spouse under valid Medicaid transfer 
                                                             
 218. Belshe v. Hope, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 917, 925 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).  See also N.D. Dep’t of 
Human Servs. v. Thompson, 586 N.W.2d 847, 851 (N.D. 1998) (“[The] broad purpose [of estate 
recovery] is furthered more fully by allowing states to trace a recipient’s assets and recover them 
from the estate of a recipient’s surviving spouse.”).  But see In re Estate of Budney, 541 N.W.2d 
245, 246 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that the state statute was preempted by federal law when it 
sought recovery from the estate of a surviving spouse without a preceding transfer). 
 219. Hines, 831 N.E.2d at 647 (“No definition of [the decedent’s] estate, no matter how broad, 
can trump the statute’s absolute prohibition against recovery from any person not covered by an 
express exception . . . .  The federal statute clearly and unambiguously states that recovery of any 
medical payments is generally not permitted.”). 
 220. Id. 
 221. See infra Part III. 
 222. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(A) (2012). 
 223. Id. § 1396p(b)(4)(B). 
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rules.224  Later, the non-recipient spouse may opt for an inter vivos transfer of 
that property, or retain that gifted property up to and including that spouse’s 
death.225  Are the assets that passed to the non-recipient spouse included in the 
terms of the estate recovery statute, even though they did not pass “through joint 
tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, [or] living trust”?226 
Because of the terms of the federal statute, states are stymied by the question 
of whether to include inter vivos transfers within the parameters of the estate 
recovery program.227  The following two decisions offer contrasting views on 
this issue. 
A.  The McCormick Approach: Other Arrangement 
At least one court has held that a state may recover the value of inter vivos 
transferred property from the estate of the surviving spouse of a recipient under 
what is described as tracing of assets.228  In deciding In re Estate of Wirtz,229 the 
Supreme Court of North Dakota adopted a policy expressing “wide latitude in 
seeking Medicaid benefit recoveries,”230 holding that the state may trace the 
assets owned by the non-recipient spouse at death to the Medicaid recipient so 
as to recover expenditures for Medicaid payments.231  The state court held that 
tracing is permitted under the federal statute’s incorporation of an “other 
arrangement” provision.232  Nonetheless, the court also ruled that collection may 
not be made “from a surviving spouse’s separately-owned assets because of a 
past obligation to pay a now deceased Medicaid recipient’s medical expenses as 
necessaries, or recovery from the surviving spouse’s entire estate, including 
assets not traceable from the recipient.”233  This limitation is not a surprise, as it 
was also recited in an earlier decision, which held that any separately owned 
assets in the recipient spouse’s estate are not available for tracing because they 
were never assets in which the decedent recipient held an interest.234  The point 
is a simple one: the federal recovery provisions permit recovery of assets passing 
to a non-recipient spouse through probate or nonprobate transfer, and there is no 
express incorporation of assets gifted to a non-recipient spouse.  Nonetheless, 
                                                             
 224. See id. § 1396p(b)(4)(A)‒(B). 
 225. Id. § 1396p(c)(1)(J). 
 226. Id. § 1396p(b)(4)(B). 
 227. See infra Part III.A‒B. 
 228. See In re Estate of Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d 882, 886 (N.D. 2000). 
 229. 607 N.W.2d 882 (N.D. 2000). 
 230. Id. at 886 (citing In re Estate of Thomson, 586 N.W.2d 847, 851 (N.D. 1998)). 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. at 885‒86. 
 233. Id. at 886. 
 234. See In re Bergman, 688 N.W.2d 187, 191 (N.D. 2004) (holding that it was permissible for 
the state to trace assets from the recipient to his spouse and then to the spouse’s son for purposes 
of collection); but see In re Estate of Barg, 752 N.W.2d 52, 71 (Minn. 2008) (holding that the state 
may only recover from assets in which the Medicaid recipient had a legal interest at the time of the 
recipient’s death). 
58 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 65:27 
the Wirtz decision held that such power is given in the statute’s provision for 
“other arrangement.”235 
Tracing of assets has been allowed in other states, too. Support for a state’s 
ability to trace resources in accordance with the federal Medicaid statute was 
sustained in Idaho Department of Health & Welfare v. McCormick,236 decided 
by the Supreme Court of Idaho.237  In McCormick, prior to marriage, a wife 
owned a home as her separate property, but then during the marriage she 
executed a quitclaim deed transferring the home to herself and her husband.238  
Three years later, she executed a durable power of attorney naming her husband 
as her attorney in fact.239  The next year the husband, operating under the durable 
power, conveyed the house to himself as sole owner and then six weeks later 
applied for Medicaid assistance to pay for his wife’s long-term care.240  The wife 
qualified for Medicaid assistance and more than $106,251.08 was paid before 
she died four years after qualification.241 
The husband predeceased his wife by one year and his daughter was appointed 
as the personal representative of his estate; the only asset was the house shared 
by the couple and previously transferred. 242   The house was appraised at 
$81,688.95.243  The wife was still receiving long-term care benefits when the 
husband died, so the state filed a claim against the house in which the husband 
was living under the state’s estate recovery program, targeting “any property or 
estate which, at any time, had been the community property of the decedent and 
decedent’s spouse, or which had been the property of decedent’s spouse.”244  
The magistrate court denied the state’s claim against the husband’s house 
because the wife (the Medicaid recipient) would have no interest in the house at 
the time of her death; the district court affirmed this decision, holding that if 
recovery were allowed it would conflict with federal law.245  Such a holding is 
not inconsistent with other state courts that have held that the recipient spouse 
must have an interest in the property at the time of his or her death in order to 
make the property subject to estate recovery and be within the parameters of 
                                                             
 235. Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d at 885. 
 236. 283 P.3d 785 (Idaho 2012). 
 237. Id. at 794.  See also In re Estate of Peterson, 340 P.3d 1143, 1151‒52 (Idaho 2014) 
(holding that an entire inter vivos transfer of interest by a Medicaid recipient was available for 
estate recovery, not just the life estate); In re Estate of Wiggins, 306 P.3d 201, 203, 209 (Idaho 
2013) (finding that the state may trace community assets that had been transmuted into separate 
property of the non-recipient spouse for Medicaid eligibility). 
 238. McCormick, 283 P.3d at 786. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. at 787 (citing IDAHO CODE ANN. § 56-218 (West 2015)). 
 245. Id. at 787‒88. 
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federal law.246  But the McCormick court formulated a different approach, one 
that permits and recognizes that “excess resources saved by virtue of Medicaid 
funds are meant to be tracked and recovered.”247 
On appeal from the decision of the magistrate court, the Idaho Supreme Court 
ruled that federal Medicaid rules should be read broadly, distinguishing it from 
other courts that interpreted the language of the Medicaid statute as less 
inclusive.248  The court held that a broad interpretation of the Medicaid statute 
includes an appreciation of “the Medicaid program’s overall purpose,” 249 
prompting an expansive definition of “estate” to include “the value of the assets 
of the estate that had been . . . community property, or the deceased participant’s 
share of the separate property, and jointly owned property” of a deceased 
Medicaid recipient or that person’s spouse.250  Based on this broad interpretation 
of the Medicaid statute, it follows that the federal legislation “seems to 
specifically address resources in which the recipient had an interest at one time 
but disposed of through her own actions or those of her spouse—such as a 
lifetime transfer of a home.”251  The court’s ruling thus permits estate recovery 
efforts to reach assets that had been transferred by gift during the course of the 
recipient’s life to the recipient’s surviving spouse or others.252 
In the case of In re Estate of Barg,253 the Supreme Court of Minnesota did not 
permit this.254  Instead, that court restricted recovery to assets actually owned by 
the recipient at the time of the recipient’s death, or that passed at the recipient’s 
death to a surviving spouse through probate or nonprobate transfer.255  In either 
situation, the state’s estate recovery is not preempted by federal law because the 
asset is owned by the recipient at the time of death.256 
The reasons behind the McCormick court’s decision are as follows.  First, 
federal legislation mandating estate recovery programs should be read in an 
expansive fashion, truly making Medicaid “the payer of last resort.”257  Second, 
the federal statute’s reference to other assets provides the basis for recovering 
those assets, even though these assets may have to be tracked or traced through 
                                                             
 246. See, e.g., In re Estate of Barg, 752 N.W.2d 52, 71 (Minn. 2008). 
 247. McCormick, 283 P.3d at 788. 
 248. Id. at 793 (“Thus, while the Barg court seemed convinced that the language [of the 
Medicaid statute] excluded lifetime transfers, we find it to be ambiguously inclusive.”). 
 249. Id. at 789.  See also id. at 794 (“At the very least, it renders the proper scope of recovery 
somewhat ambiguous, in which case this Court may look to the overall purpose of the statute for 
guidance.”). 
 250. Id. at 790 (citing IDAHO ADMIN. CODE r. 16.03.09.905 (2015)). 
 251. Id. at 793 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h)(1) (2012)). 
 252. Id. at 794‒95. 
 253. 752 N.W.2d 52 (Minn. 2008). 
 254. Id. at 71‒72. 
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 256. Id. at 73–74. 
 257. McCormick, 283 P.3d at 788. 
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the estate of the recipient’s spouse.258  Third, the federal reference to “other 
arrangements” may be read to include assets that were held by the recipient but 
transferred to a spouse before death, during lifetime, and therefore not present at 
the time of death.259  Fourth, the court stated: 
[The] ambiguously inclusive language in the definition of “estate”—
purporting to extend recovery to assets transferred by “other 
arrangements”—coupled with the definition of “assets”—plainly 
including the resources of the recipient’s spouse as well as assets the 
recipient disposed of before death—calls into question the Estate’s 
strict reliance on the phrase “at the time of death.”260 
Finally, the court’s reluctance to hold that federal law preempts state law, plus 
the overall purpose of Medicaid estate recovery, permits recovery from assets 
transferred during lifetime and not available at the time of death.261 
By holding that the federal Medicaid statutes must be read in an expansive 
manner, the Supreme Court of Idaho in its McCormick decision joined the 
reasoning of the Supreme Court of North Dakota in Wirtz.262  The courts in both 
cases held that Congress intended “to allow states to trace the assets of recipients 
of medical assistance and recover the benefits paid when the recipient’s 
surviving spouse dies.”263  At least, as the court concluded in McCormick, this 
is an acceptable rationale upon which state courts may act when there is no 
explicit preemption pronouncement by Congress.264  The court summarized its 
holding and rationale with the following: “This Court has been loathe in the past 
to surrender State sovereignty to the federal government and has found 
preemption of our State’s duly enacted laws only where the congressional intent 
is rather clear.”265  Implicitly, the court concluded that it could read the federal 
statute in an expansive manner to permit tracing inter vivos gifts to their source, 
regardless of whether these assets were owned by a recipient of long-term 
benefits at the time of death.266   In addition to applying a more expansive 
definition of federal Medicaid statutes, the McCormick decision differed because 
it also defined “assets” as encompassing all resources of both spouses, permitted 
                                                             
 258. Id. at 791 (referencing the Idaho estate recovery statute, IDAHO CODE ANN. § 56-218(4) 
(West 2015), and Idaho’s regulation permitting “recovery through the recipient’s spouse’s estate 
not only of assets in which the recipient holds an interest at the time of death, but also ‘assets of the 
estate that had been, at any time after October 1, 1993, community property’”) (citing IDAHO 
ADMIN. CODE r. 16.03.09.905.01 (West 2015)). 
 259. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B) (2012)). 
 260. Id. at 794 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396p(b)(4), (h)(1)). 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. (citing In re Estate of Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d 882, 886 (N.D. 2000)). 
 263. Id. at 794 (citing Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d at 886 (N.D. 2000)). 
 264. Id. 
 265. Id. (citing Christian v. Mason, 219 P.3d 473, 476 (Idaho 2009)). 
 266. Id. at 794‒95. 
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estate recovery to reach assets passing at the time of death, and traced assets that 
passed during lifetime.267 
B.  The Barg Approach: Preemption 
Not all courts are willing to apply a more expansive view of state authority.268  
One court holding an opposite view to the McCormick court is the Supreme 
Court of Minnesota in its decision of In re Estate of Barg.269  The Barg decision 
relied upon the express wording of the federal statute, resulting in federal 
preemption of expansive construction by state courts.270  Specifically, in Barg, 
the court held that Medicaid law preempts any expansive definition or practice 
aimed at recovering “the value of the assets of the estate that were marital 
property or jointly owned property at any time during the marriage.”271  If these 
assets were transferred during lifetime and not available at death, federal law 
preempts estate recovery.272  The facts of the case involved spouses, married in 
1948 and remaining married until the wife’s death in 2004, a period of fifty-six 
years.273  During the 1960s, the couple took joint tenancy title of two parcels of 
real property in Minnesota and owned them when the wife applied for Medicaid 
benefits in 2001.274  Her application was approved, and shortly thereafter she 
transferred her interest in the real estate to her husband; she also surrendered any 
interest in certificates of deposit held at the local bank.275  Subsequently, the 
husband executed a last will and testament “leaving his estate to his surviving 
descendants, and making no provision for his wife.”276 
                                                             
 267. Id. at 793 (noting that “[a]lthough the Barg court analyzed the definition of ‘estate’ in 42 
U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B), it did not address the definition of ‘assets’ in section 1396p(h)(1)”).  See 
also id. at 794‒95 (allowing estate recovery for assets passing at time of death and tracing assets 
that passed in lifetime). 
 268. See, e.g., In re Estate of Barg, 752 N.W.2d 52, 65‒66 (Minn. 2008).  See also In re Craig, 
624 N.E.2d 1003 (N.Y. 1993) (stating that federal law “gives the States, at their option, the power 
to recover against a spouse’s estate, but only against the recipient’s assets that were conveyed 
through joint tenancy and other specified forms of survivorship”). 
 269. 752 N.W.2d 52 (Minn. 2008).  See also Gheen v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Health, Div. of 
Healthcare Fin./Equalitycare, 326 P.3d 918, 923 (Wyo. 2014) (holding that the statutory definition 
of “estate” does not include property transferred prior to death). 
 270. See Barg, 752 N.W.2d at 69‒71.  The court noted, “[the government’s] argument would 
take us too far down the path of favoring the purpose of the law at the expense of the plain meaning 
of its language,” id. at 69, that “other arrangement” means “arrangements other than those expressly 
listed that also convey assets at the time of the Medicaid recipient’s death,” id. at 70, and that “the 
language of the federal law clearly limits [an] expansion to assets in which the recipient had an 
interest at the time of her death.” id. at 71. 
 271. Id. at 68 (citing MINN. STAT. ANN. § 256B.15, subdiv. 2 (West 2015)). 
 272. Id. at 73‒74. 
 273. Id. at 57. 
 274. Id. 
 275. Id. 
 276. Id. 
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The wife died in 2004 after receiving $108,413.53 in Medicaid benefits; the 
husband died five months later without ever having received similar benefits 
himself.277  Two months after the husband’s death, the state filed a claim against 
his estate to recover the full amount of the Medicaid benefits paid on behalf of 
the decedent’s wife, “arguing that the entire value of the marital property, both 
the homestead and the certificates of deposit, was subject to its claim because 
[the wife’s] joint tenancy interest gave her a right to use of the entire 
property.”278  This, the state argued, was consistent with Minnesota’s recovery 
statute that permitted the state to recover marital property owned as joint tenancy 
at any time during the marriage.279  The district court held that the wife’s interest 
in the home was limited “because she had conveyed it to her husband before her 
death, evaluated her interest as a life estate, and upheld the partial 
disallowance.”280  The state appealed, arguing that it was entitled to the full 
value of the property, but the appellate court ruled that the wife had only a joint 
interest in the property, equivalent to one-half the value, and thereby limited 
recovery. 281   The state then appealed to the Supreme Court of Minnesota, 
seeking full recovery of the transferred property.282 
The issue for the state’s highest court was whether federal legislation required, 
for purposes of recovery, that any interest in marital or jointly owned property 
be held by the recipient spouse at the time of his or her death.283  The facts 
indicate that the wife did not own the property at the time of her death, and the 
state’s court of appeals held that this was required,284 based on that court’s 
reading of the federal statute.285   However, the state argued that there was 
“nothing in the federal statute prior to the 1993 amendments that limited the 
                                                             
 277. Id. 
 278. Id. 
 279. Id. at 64‒65.  See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 256B.15, subd. 2 (West 2015) (“Recovery of 
medical assistance expenses in the nonrecipient surviving spouse’s estate is limited to the value of 
the assets of the estate that were marital property or jointly owned property at any time during the 
marriage.”). 
 280. Barg, 752 N.W.2d at 56. 
 281. Id. 
 282. Id. at 58. 
 283. Id. at 62–63 (reciting the broader three issues). 
 284. Id. (citing In re Estate of Barg, 722 N.W.2d 492, 497 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006); In re Estate 
of Gullberg, 652 N.W.2d 709, 714 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002)). 
 285. Barg, 752 N.W.2d at 62.  The court stated: 
The court of appeals held that a partial disallowance of the County’s claim was proper, 
relying on its earlier decision in Gullberg that the broad [state] authorization . . . for 
recovery up to the value of all assets of the estate that were marital property or jointly 
owned at any time during the marriage was partially preempted by the 1993 amendments 
to the federal law that limit the expanded estate to assets in which the recipient spouse 
had a legal interest at the time of her death. 
Id. (citing Barg, 722 N.W.2d at 495‒96).  See also 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B) (2012) (stating that 
the “estate,” for recovery purposes, “may include . . . any other . . . assets in which the individual 
had any legal title or interest at the time of death”). 
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states’ authority to pursue estate recovery of Medicaid benefits paid, and that the 
1993 amendments were intended by Congress to expand state options, not limit 
them.”286  In response, the estate of the surviving spouse argued that “there 
should be no recovery here because [the recipient] had no legal interest in the 
homestead or the certificates of deposit at the time of her death, having conveyed 
her interest to her husband during her lifetime.”287 
Reviewing both arguments, the state supreme court looked first to the fact that 
federal law permits recovery only from the recipient’s estate and not from the 
separate estate of the surviving spouse.288  States that permit recovery from the 
surviving spouse’s estate—in spite of contrary language in the federal statute—
must do so because these states conclude that the assets passed to the surviving 
spouse289 and would therefore come within the terms of the federal legislation, 
even though recovery cannot be sought until after the surviving spouse’s 
death.290  Thus, federal law would not preempt the state from recovering assets 
that the surviving spouse obtained from the recipient as a result of inheritance 
through probate or nonprobate transfer.291  But this would not encompass all 
forms of transfer.292  Would inter vivos transfers, illustrated by the facts of the 
Barg decision, be available for estate recovery?  The Minnesota statute would 
permit recovering from the surviving spouse’s estate “the value of the assets of 
the estate that were marital property or jointly owned property at any time during 
the marriage.”293  Does preemption apply to a state statute permitting recovery 
from transfers at “any time during the marriage”?294  This is the issue considered 
in Barg. 
The court held that federal law preempts the state statute’s warrant to recover 
from assets or interests owned at any time during the marriage.295  The court 
“conclude[d] that there is no principled basis on which to interpret the federal 
law to allow recovery of assets in which the Medicaid recipient did not have an 
interest at the time of her death.”296  The facts of this case illustrate a Medicaid 
recipient who transferred her joint tenancy interest in her real estate and 
                                                             
 286. Barg, 752 N.W.2d at 62. 
 287. Id. at 62‒63. 
 288. Id. at 64 (citing Hines v. Dep’t of Pub. Aid, 850 N.E.2d 148, 152‒53 (Ill. 2006)). 
 289. Id. at 66 (citing Bucholtz v. Belshe, 114 F.3d 923, 927 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that federal 
law did not preempt state recovery of assets in the recipient’s estate and any recipient of the property 
by distribution or survival)). 
 290. Id. 
 291. Id. at 68. 
 292. Id. 
 293. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 256B.15, subdiv. 2 (West 2015) (emphasis added). 
 294. Barg, 752 N.W.2d at 69 (citing In re Estate of Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d 882, 885‒86 (N.D. 
2000)) (stating that Wirtz was an example of one state that has held that federal preemption does 
not apply to recovery from transfers at any time during the marriage, not just through survivorship). 
 295. Id. at 71. 
 296. Id. 
64 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 65:27 
surrendered any interest in her certificates of deposit during her lifetime.297  
Thus, these assets were not “assets in which the individual had any legal title or 
interest at the time of death.”298  The Barg court rejected the suggestion that the 
federal statute’s inclusion of “or other arrangement” when coupled with 
statutory ambiguity and congressional purpose to permit state recovery justify 
an expansive approach permitting recovery from all assets in a surviving 
spouse’s estate no matter how such assets acquired were from a recipient’s 
estate.299  Recognizing that the state’s appeals court ruled that the recipient 
spouse did retain a joint interest in the lifetime transfer as an “other 
arrangement,” the state’s highest court held that it could accept this 
conclusion.300  The court stated: 
The language of section 1396p(b)(4) requires that any interest 
included in the expanded estate must be one in which the Medicaid 
recipient had an interest at the time of her death, not one that was 
previously conveyed.  We conclude that [the recipient] did not retain 
a joint tenancy interest in the property at the time of her death, because 
that interest was effectively and legally transferred before her death.301 
Furthermore, the state’s Medicaid estate recovery statute “is preempted to the 
extent that it allows recovery from assets in which the deceased Medicaid 
recipient did not have a legal interest at the time of death, and to the extent that 
it permits recovery beyond the extent of the recipient’s interest.”302 
All of the decisions cited, Wirtz, McCormick, and Barg, have a common 
element: they seek to decipher the language of the federal Medicaid statute to 
determine if the federal statute preempts state efforts to recover from a recipient 
spouse’s estate the value of assets of the estate that were marital property or 
jointly owned property at any time during the marriage.303  Barg held that estate 
                                                             
 297. Id. at 57. 
 298. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B) (2012). 
 299. Barg, 752 N.W.2d at 69 (suggesting that the “argument would take us too far down the 
path of favoring the purpose of the law at the expense of the plain meaning of its language”). 
 300. Id. at 71‒72. 
 301. Id. at 72. 
 302. Id. at 73–74. 
 303. See, e.g., Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. McCormick, 283 P.3d 785, 791 (Idaho 
2012).  At issue is the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4): 
For purposes of this subsection, the term “estate”,  with respect to a deceased individual 
. . . (B) may include, at the option of the State . . . any other real and personal property 
and other assets in which the individual had any legal title or interest at the time of 
death[,] . . . including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased 
individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living 
trust, or other arrangement. 
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) (2012).  See also In re Estate of Barg, 752 N.W.2d 52, 63 (Minn. 2008); 
In re Estate of Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d 882, 884‒86 (N.D. 2000). 
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recovery does not reach everything, but only to property in which there is a legal 
interest at the time of death.304 
Other courts have held similarly, one being the Supreme Court of 
Wyoming.305  The Wyoming decision involved a residence and a farm owned 
by a married couple as tenants by the entirety.306  The husband died intestate; 
one-half of the property went to his wife, and the other half was divided between 
their two sons.307  Subsequently, the mother transferred her one-half interest in 
the property to her sons, thereby relinquishing any ownership, but she did not 
tell the sons what she had done.308  Four years later, one of the sons applied for 
Medicaid benefits for his mother and listed the properties in which he thought 
the mother still had an interest.309  The mother was approved for Medicaid and 
received approximately $10,508.54 in benefits prior to her death.310  Then, after 
her death, the sons discovered the quitclaim deeds for the properties and 
recorded them so they did not form part of their mother’s estate.311  Nonetheless, 
the state filed a lien against the properties to recover for the Medicaid 
expenditures,312 asserting that the mother had an interest in the properties at the 
time of her death.313  The district court agreed, approving the state’s lien under 
the estate recovery program.314 
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the state’s statute 
pertaining to estate recovery and the corresponding definition of what constitutes 
an estate.315  The court concluded that “the statutory definition of estate does not 
include property properly transferred prior to death.”316  However, Gheen held 
that the mother did not effectively transfer the properties to the sons by quitclaim 
deeds prior to her death.317  Thus, because the Medicaid recipient, the mother, 
                                                             
 304. Barg, 752 N.W.2d at 70 (“Inclusion in the list of examples of ‘such assets’ is predicated 
on the recipient having a legal interest at the time of death.”). 
 305. Gheen v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Health, Div. of Healthcare Fin./Equalitycare, 326 P.3d 
918, 923 (Wyo. 2014) (discussing WYO. STAT. ANN. § 42-4-206(g)(ii) (West 2015), and noting 
that the state’s definition of “estate” included “other assets in which the individual had any legal 
title or interest at the time of death”). 
 306. Id. at 921. 
 307. Id. 
 308. Id. 
 309. Id. 
 310. Id. 
 311. Id. 
 312. Id. 
 313. Id. at 922. 
 314. Id. 
 315. Id. at 922‒23.  See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 42-4-207(j) (West 2015) (providing for filing of 
liens against the property of an estate); id. § 42-4-206(g) (defining “estate” for purposes of 
recovery). 
 316. Gheen, 326 P.3d at 923 (citing Estate of Marusich v. State, ex rel., Dep’t of Health, Office 
of Fin./Equalitycare, 313 P.3d 1272, 1277‒78 (Wyo. 2013)). 
 317. Id. at 926 (“The deeds were not, therefore, effective to reduce or eliminate [the mother’s] 
ownership or control of the assets.”). 
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had an interest in the property at the time of her death, the property formed part 
of her estate subject to estate recovery in accordance with the state statute.318  
Barg and Gheen both rely on the wording of the federal statute.319  When the 
federal statute defines the estate from which estate recovery may be taken, the 
statute refers to assets at the time of death or assets conveyed by a deceased 
individual.320  Such precision, according to these courts, offers no opportunity 
for an expansive reading of estate recovery.321  The Barg court concluded that 
“there is no principled basis on which to interpret the federal law to allow 
recovery of assets in which the Medicaid recipient did not have an interest at the 
time of her death.”322  Other courts, Wirtz and McCormick among them, chose 
not to employ such a restrictive interpretation of the federal statute. 323  
McCormick, for example, scrutinizing the same statute, concluded that the 
statute “contain[s] ambiguities” and permitted a more expansive definition. 324  
Thus, McCormick looked to another section of the federal statute and applied 
the definition of “assets” to the “estate” from which recovery may be 
obtained.325  The court concluded that if the definition of estate extended to 
assets conveyed through other arrangements, there should be no strict 
requirement that estate assets be restricted to time of death.326  Instead, the assets 
may be traced to an interest some time previously.327  The issue raised in all of 
these cases could be resolved by modifying the federal statute. 
                                                             
 318. Id. 
 319. See In re Estate of Barg, 752 N.W.2d 52, 70 (Minn. 2008) (stating that the court “return[s] 
again to the language of the federal statute”); Gheen, 326 P.3d at 922‒23. 
 320. See Barg, 752 N.W.2d at 70 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B) (2012)) (stating that “[t]he 
federal optional definition of ‘estate’ allows inclusion of ‘any other real and personal property and 
other assets in which the individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death . . . including 
such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased”). 
 321. See id. at 70; Gheen, 326 P.3d at 922‒23. 
 322. Barg, 752 N.W.2d at 71. 
 323. See Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. McCormick, 283 P.3d 785, 793 (Idaho 2012) 
(stating than an “expansive definition of ‘assets,’ which is imported into section 1396p(b)(4)’s 
definition of ‘estate’ by the definition’s use of that term, well supports Idaho’s provision for 
recovery from the estates of both spouses”); In re Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d 882, 885 (N.D. 2000) (stating 
that “[r]ecovery is not limited to assets in the surviving spouse’s estate that the Medicaid recipient 
had legal title to and conveyed through joint tenancy, tenancy-in-common, survivorship, life estate, 
or living trust”). 
 324. McCormick, 283 P.3d at 793.  The court concluded, “[a]lthough the juxtaposition of the 
language ‘at the time of death’ and the other, more inclusive language in the statute is perplexing, 
we find that ambiguity insufficient to overcome our presumption against preemption of state law.”  
Id. at 794. 
 325. Id. at 793.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h)(1) (2012) (“The term ‘assets’ . . . includes all income 
and resources of the individual and of the individual’s spouse, including any income or resources 
which the individual or such individual’s spouse is entitled to but does not receive because of 
action—(A) by the individual or such individual’s spouse . . . .”). 
 326. See McCormick, 283 P.3d at 794. 
 327. See id. 
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IV.  THIRD ISSUE: SPOUSAL ANNUITIES 
A.  Annuity Planning 
The DRA continued the practice of treating the separate income and assets of 
the non-institutionalized spouse as exempt from consideration when establishing 
eligibility for the other spouse’s long-term care.328  In addition, in determining 
eligibility for the institutionalized spouse, the community spouse’s income is not 
considered.329  The MCCA created the “minimum monthly maintenance needs 
allowance” to permit the non-recipient spouse to receive a continuous flow of 
income.330  The level of income is based on a combination of a basic allowance 
and excess shelter allowance.331   Typically, the non-institutionalized spouse 
would purchase an annuity with non-exempt assets so as to create an income 
flow that would be exempt from consideration.332  Such a practice is common 
and permits the non-institutionalized spouse to continue a sustainable lifestyle, 
living off income generated from assets that would otherwise have to be depleted 
before the institutionalized spouse would qualify for Medicaid.333  Any annuity 
contract purchased by the non-recipient spouse had to specify that the state 
would be the preferred remainder beneficiary to the extent necessary to pay for 
expenditures made on behalf of the institutionalized spouse.334 
Elder law attorneys often employ annuities whenever there are excess assets, 
and the annuity can safeguard funds for the non-institutionalized spouse.335  
Excess occurs when applying for benefits. 336   Medicaid permits a non-
                                                             
 328. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(b)(1).  For statutory provisions pertaining to disclosure and treatment 
of annuities, see id. § 1396p(e). 
 329. See id. § 1396r-5(b)(1). 
 330. Id. § 1396r-5(d)(3)(A). 
 331. Id. 
 332. See, e.g., Hutcherson v. Ariz. Health Care Cost Containment Sys. Admin., 667 F.3d 1066, 
1069 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding as acceptable a spouse converting his or her assets into an annuity 
and thus making the annuity exempt from consideration for the other spouse’s eligibility for 
Medicaid long-term care).  Medicaid specifically allows the community spouse to purchase an 
annuity.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)(F)(i). 
 333. See Hutcherson, 667 F.3d at 1071.  The court pointed out: 
[I]f [the husband], instead of purchasing the annuity, attempted to transfer funds to 
Appellant, [the wife] would have been ineligible for Medicaid for the approximate length 
of time that the funds could have covered [her] medical costs.  By purchasing an annuity, 
[the husband] avoided this transfer penalty. . . .  [The husband] was entitled to collect 
monthly payments from the annuity for as long as he lived. 
Id. at 1072. 
 334. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e)(2). 
 335. For a description of the practice, see Sean R. Bleck, Barbara Isenhour & John A. Miller, 
Preserving Wealth and Inheritance Through Medicaid Planning for Long-Term Care, 17 MICH. 
ST. U. J. MED. & L. 153, 193‒94 (2013). 
 336. See id. at 160 (noting that “the applicant must spend down the excess income over the 
Medicaid rate on medical costs before he or she will be eligible for Medicaid coverage for other 
medical expenses”). 
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institutionalized spouse to exempt certain specified assets, but there may be 
excess assets that would have to be spent prior to the institutionalized spouse 
obtaining Medicaid eligibility.337  Rather than spend the assets on institutional 
care, elder law practitioners recommend purchasing an annuity to provide 
income to the non-institutionalized spouse. 338   This income would not be 
considered an asset because the MCCA provides that “[d]uring any month in 
which an institutionalized spouse is in the institution . . . no income of the 
community spouse shall be deemed available to the institutionalized spouse.”339  
The annuity would have to be “actuarially sound” and “irrevocable and 
nonassignable,” and the rates would have to correspond with tables maintained 
by the Social Security Administration.340  Most often any annuity would be for 
a term of years, naming the state as the preferred remainder beneficiary after any 
minor or disabled child.341 
B.  Transferable Assets 
Illustrating both the process and the challenge of annuities is Lopes v. 
Department of Social Services. 342   The facts involved a husband and wife 
applying for Medicaid for the husband.343  The MCCA specified that the state, 
when considering an application from a married couple, could exclude certain 
community spouse funds and assets from calculations of total resources.344  The 
                                                             
 337. Id. at 194‒95. 
 338. Id. 
 339. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(b)(1). 
 340. Id. § 1396p(c)(1)(G)(ii)(I)‒(II).  In addition, the annuity would have to “provide[] for 
payments in equal amounts during the term of the annuity, with no deferral and no balloon payments 
made.”  Id. § 1396p(c)(1)(G)(ii)(III). 
 341. See, e.g., Hutcherson v. Ariz. Health Care Cost Containment Sys. Admin., 667 F.3d 1066, 
1067 (9th Cir. 2012).  In Hutcherson, the husband purchased an annuity in his name with the excess 
assets he and his wife owned so that the money would be exempt and the wife would qualify for 
Medicaid assistance.  Id. at 1067–68.  The husband purchased an annuity for $100,000 and it paid 
a monthly amount of $2,781.63 for thirty-six months; the state was named as the remainder 
beneficiary and the daughter was named the second beneficiary.  Id.  The husband died and there 
was a remainder value in the annuity of approximately $75,000.  Id.  As the first remainder 
beneficiary the state collected the annuity benefits, having already paid $23,840.51 in benefits for 
the wife’s care; the state applied what it received from the annuity first to the ongoing cost of the 
wife’s care and the excess of $228.71 towards the past expenditure.  Id.  When the wife ceased 
receiving Medicaid assistance, the annuity benefit was used to pay off the remaining balance on the 
wife’s care.  Id.  Once the state was paid $60,840.51, it released its claim against the annuity, and 
the daughter was entitled to the remaining amount.  Id.  But the daughter challenged the state’s 
ability to take from the annuity, arguing that the state’s recovery was limited to expenses incurred 
on behalf of the husband and the husband had never been institutionalized and had no expenses.  
Id.  The district court disagreed and held that the plain meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)(F)(i) 
allows the state to reach a deceased non-institutionalized spouse’s annuity for costs incurred on 
behalf of an institutionalized spouse.  Id.  The Ninth Circuit affirmed.  Id. at 1072. 
 342. 696 F.3d 180, 182‒83 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 343. Id. at 183. 
 344. Id. at 182 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(c)(2)(A)). 
2015] Selective Issues in Effective Medicaid Estate Recovery Statutes 69 
wife applied for benefits, but the applicable community spouse resource 
allowance was approximately $180,000, and there were assets in excess of this 
amount totaling $160,000.345  To reduce this excess amount and thereby qualify 
for Medicaid benefits, the wife “purchased an immediate single premium 
annuity with a premium of $166,878.99” that “provided for monthly payments 
of $2,340.83 over a period of approximately six years.”346  The annuity contract 
specified that the annuity was “not transferable” and rights could not “be 
assigned, sold, anticipated, alienated, commuted, surrendered, cashed in or 
pledged as security for a loan.”347  Even though a third party was willing to 
purchase the six-year payment stream for approximately $99,000, the wife 
“maintained that the annuity was a ‘fixed income stream’” and not an asset that 
needed to be liquidated to pay for her husband’s institutional care.348  But the 
state’s Medicaid official denied the husband’s application for benefits because 
it was technically possible for the wife to sell the annuity income stream to a 
third party, making the annuity transferrable.349  The wife appealed the decision, 
and the district court agreed with the wife, holding that the wife did not have the 
power to alienate or transfer her interest.350  The Medicaid official appealed, and 
the appellate court agreed to consider whether the annuity is non-assignable and, 
if so, “whether it is [to be considered as] income or a resource.”351 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the facts and held 
that: 
The language of the relevant regulations, as clarified in the 
[Supplemental Security Income (SSI) Program Operations Manual 
System (POMS)] and in [the United States Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS)]’s amicus brief, convinces us that the income 
stream from Lopes’s annuity is properly considered income, not a 
resource, because the annuity is non-assignable.352 
                                                             
 345. Id. at 183. 
 346. Id. 
 347. Id. 
 348. Id. 
 349. Id. (stating that the Medicaid official relied upon Social Services’ Uniform Policy Manual 
§ 4030.47, which provides that in determining benefit eligibility, “the right to receive income from 
an annuity is regarded as an available asset, whether or not the annuity is assignable”) (quoting 
CONN. DEP’T OF SOC. SERVS., UNIFORM POLICY MANUAL § 4030.47 (2007)). 
 350. Id. at 183‒84. 
 351. Id. at 184. 
 352. Id.  Other decisions support the rationale of Lopes, that any annuity is non-assignable if 
the terms of the contract forbid “cashing-in” the annuity even when there is a willing purchaser.  
See, e.g., James v. Richman, 547 F.3d 214, 218 (3d Cir. 2008) (“Even if the Department is correct 
that [the wife] has the de facto ability to effect a change in ownership of the annuity, she cannot do 
so without breaching the contract and incurring legal liability.  Accordingly, the annuity cannot be 
treated as an available resource.”); Geston v. Olson, 857 F. Supp. 2d 863, 876‒77 (D.N.D. 2012) 
(noting that the annuity cannot be revoked, assigned, or liquidated); but see Estate of Gross v. N.D. 
Dep’t of Human Servs., 687 N.W.2d 460, 465 (N.D. 2004) (“We conclude there was evidence from 
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The crucial factor for the court was the contractual terms by which the wife 
agreed to surrender her right to assign her payments under the annuity.353  The 
court held that “[u]nder [state] law, this language suffices to make the annuity 
non-assignable.”354  But the Medicaid official remained adamant that an owner 
of a non-assignable annuity has the effective right, authority, or power to 
liquidate the asset as long as there is a prospective purchaser for the payment 
stream.355  Nonetheless, the Second Circuit likened the annuity purchased in this 
case to other forms of unearned income that are classified as non-assignable even 
though there may be a prospective purchaser. 356   Because SSI regulations 
supported the view that various other forms of income streams, such as social 
security benefits and disability benefits can be considered as non-assignable, it 
was possible that this annuity was non-assignable, too.357 
As an alternative rationale for denying exemption to the annuity, the Medicaid 
official argued that because the wife purchased the annuity shortly before 
applying for Medicaid benefits for her husband, the cash resource should still be 
considered an asset or a resource held by the applicant within the sixty-month 
period, thereby disqualifying the husband.358  But the Second Circuit declined 
to classify the cash that was used to purchase the annuity as a resource.359  
Instead, the court looked to the federal statute that permits states to exclude 
                                                             
which a reasoning mind could reasonably conclude there was a market for the monthly payments 
from this annuity.”). 
 353. Lopes, 696 F.3d at 185 (“The [terms] strip[] Lopes of both the right to assign her payments 
under the annuity . . . and the power to assign her payments . . . .”). 
 354. Id. 
 355. Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.1201(a)(1) (2015)) (“[A] community spouse’s asset is a 
resource ‘if an individual has the right, authority or power to liquidate the property, or his or her 
share of the property.’”). 
 356. Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.1121(a)) (“Some types of unearned income are . . . annuities, 
pensions, and other periodic payments.  This unearned income is usually related to prior work or 
service.  It includes, for example, private pensions, social security benefits, disability benefits, 
veterans benefits, worker’s compensation, railroad retirement annuities[,] and unemployment 
insurance benefits.”). 
 357. Id. 
 358. Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.1207(e)) (“[I]f an individual sells, exchanges or replaces a 
resource, the receipts are not income.  They are still considered to be a resource.”).  See also id. 
(citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.1103(a)) (providing that “what you receive from the sale or exchange of 
your own property is not income; it remains a resource”); id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.1103(c)) 
(stating that “receipts from the sale, exchange, or replacement of a resource are not income but are 
resources that have changed their form”). 
 359. See id. at 186 (“Nor do these regulations establish that Lopes’s annuity is a resource 
merely because it existed in the form of cash shortly before she applied for Medicaid.”).  The U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit requested an amicus brief from the Department of Health 
and Human Services expressing an opinion on the issue raised.  See Brief for U.S. Dep’t of Health 
& Human Servs. as Amici Curiae  as requested by the court at 1, Lopes v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 696 
F.3d 180 (2d Cir. 2012) (No. 10-3741-cv), 2011 WL 6742495, at *1.  The amicus brief formed the 
basis of the court’s rationale, that the annuity should not be considered as a disqualifying resource.  
Lopes, 696 F.3d at 184.  The amicus brief discussed similarities with other annuities under the SSI.  
See Brief for U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., supra at 11‒13. 
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certain community spouse funds and assets from the calculation of total 
resources. 360   Specifically, “no income of the community spouse shall be 
deemed available to the institutionalized spouse.”361  Overall, the court relied 
upon the DRA, the amicus brief of HHS, and the POMS.362  These support the 
policy of “protecting community spouses from impoverishment by permitting 
[these spouses] to retain some of their assets, while recognizing that couples 
must apply a fair share of their combined resources toward the cost of care before 
receiving benefits.”363  Therefore, as long as the spouses purchase an annuity 
and meet the requirements of a bona fide annuity under the DRA, “the 
placements of assets in an annuity will not be considered a suspect ‘transfer of 
assets’ exposing an applicant to certain penalties.”364  This is true even if the 
spouses purchase an annuity during the sixty-month period prior to eligibility, 
because “a non-assignable annuity is not a resource for purposes of determining 
Medicaid eligibility.”365 
Annuities are valid estate planning tools in some states, but suspect in others 
because of the issues raised in the Lopes decision.366  Those issues involved 
whether the annuity is a transferable resource and whether the conversion of 
assets into an annuity during the sixty-month period prior to eligibility is a 
                                                             
 360. Lopes, 696 F.3d at 186 (noting that “[t]he Medicaid program categorically excludes 
certain assets, such as a home and one automobile, from consideration as resources”) (citing 42 
U.S.C. § 1396r-5(c)(5) (2012)). 
 361. Id. at 182 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(b)(1)). 
 362. See id. at 188. 
 363. Id.  Section 405 of the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 amended the annuity 
provisions of the DRA, substituting “institutionalized individual” for “individual” when 
considering whose expenses must be recoverable from an annuity when purchasing an annuity and 
then not be considered a transfer within the look-back period.  Tax Relief and Healthcare Act of 
2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, 120 Stat. 2922, 2998.  The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
provides added clarification at SMDL 06-018.  Letter from Dennis G. Smith, supra note 36. 
 364. Lopes, 696 F.3d at 188 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(18), 1396p(c)(1)(A), (e)(1)); but see 
Cook v. Bottesch, 740 S.E.2d 752, 756 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013), rev’d on other grounds, Cook v. 
Glover, 761 S.E.2d 267 (Ga. 2014) (holding that “annuities benefiting community spouses must 
name the State as a remainder beneficiary to avoid automatically being treated as the disposal of an 
asset for less than fair market value”).  The Supreme Court of Georgia in Glover upheld the asset 
transfer penalty that the appeals court in Bottesch overturned.  Glover, 761 S.E.2d at 272. 
 365. Lopes, 696 F.3d at 188 (joining other circuits).  See Morris v. Okla. Dep’t of Human 
Servs., 685 F.3d 925, 932‒34 (10th Cir. 2012) (discussing the conditions under which a spouse 
may purchase an annuity without it counting as a resource); Hutcherson v. Ariz. Health Care Cost 
Containment Sys. Admin., 667 F.3d 1066, 1069 (9th Cir. 2012) (“The Medicaid statute allows the 
community spouse to purchase an annuity . . . . allowing the spouse to convert his or her assets, 
which are considered in determining the institutionalized spouse’s eligibility, to income, which is 
not considered.”); contra Glover, 761 S.E.2d at 268, 272 (upholding an asset transfer penalty where 
the annuity did not name the state as a remainder beneficiary). 
 366. See, e.g., Estate of Gross v. N.D. Dep’t of Human Servs., 687 N.W.2d 460, 463‒64 (N.D. 
2004). 
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disqualifying event.367  The Lopes decision relies heavily on the amicus brief of 
HHS.368  The Department’s opinion is that an annuity should not be considered 
as a countable resource, referencing the similar status of annuities for purposes 
of social security. 369   Nonetheless, the lack of uniformity among the states 
hampers planning by elder law attorneys and receipt of possible benefits by 
potential long-term care beneficiaries.370 
C.  Loans to Family Members 
Similar to annuities is the practice of loaning assets to family members, 
particularly children.  The DRA requires loans to be actuarially valid and 
repayable in equal installments, and that there be no provision for cancelling the 
loan upon the lender’s death.371  The unpublished decision of Sable v. Velez372 
involved two married couples, each seeking to qualify for Medicaid benefits to 
pay for long-term care.373  One couple purchased two promissory notes from 
their son: one for $80,903 and the other for $42,500.374  The notes were payable 
at an interest rate between three and six percent, payable in seven years, and the 
loan was made to the son without a credit check or secure collateral. 375  
Similarly, the other couple made promissory notes to each of their three children 
for $80,000, repayable with interest in monthly installments spread over four 
years.376  Subsequently, both couples were denied Medicaid benefits because the 
state agency “considered the promissory notes to be trust-like devices, requiring 
                                                             
 367. See generally Lopes, 696 F.3d at 184, 186 (stating the question of “whether [an] annuity 
is non-assignable” and whether it is “income or a resource” and stating that it is likely that “the 
payment stream from [the] non-assignable annuity [in the case] is income”). 
 368. Id. at 187‒88.  The court gave the Department of Health and Human Services a strong 
degree of deference in informing its decision.  Id. 
 369. Id. at 188.  See also Brief for the Amicus Curiae, supra note 359 at 10‒11, 18. 
 370. See supra note 366 and accompanying text. 
 371. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)(I) (2012).  The provision states: 
For purposes of this paragraph with respect to transfer of assets, the term ‘assets’ includes 
funds used to purchase a promissory note, loan, or mortgage unless such note, loan, or 
mortgage—(i) has a repayment term that is actuarially sound (as determined in 
accordance with actuarial publications of the Office of the Chief Actuary of the Social 
Security Administration); (ii) provides for payments to be made in equal amounts during 
the term of the loan, with no deferral and no balloon payments made; and (iii) prohibits 
the cancellation of the balance upon the death of the lender.  In the case of a promissory 
note, loan, or mortgage that does not satisfy the requirements of clauses (i) through (iii), 
the value of such note, loan, or mortgage shall be the outstanding balance due as of the 
date of the individual’s application for medical assistance for services described in 
subparagraph (C). 
Id. § 1396p(c)(1)(I). 
 372. 437 F. App’x 73, 76 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 373. Id. at 74‒75. 
 374. Id. 
 375. Id. 
 376. Id. at 75. 
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the[ir] inclusion in [the applicant’s] countable resources for Medicaid 
eligibility.”377 
The couples appealed the adverse rulings by the state Medicaid official, but 
“the District Court denied [their] motion for a preliminary injunction, finding 
that the plaintiffs did not make an adequate showing of success on the merits 
because a question existed as to whether a fiduciary relationship existed between 
the parents and children as borrowers and lenders.”378  Subsequently, the district 
court ruled that “the plaintiffs had failed to meet [their] burden of showing that 
the notes were not the product of a bad-faith arrangement.”379  On appeal, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ruled that two steps are required to 
establish validity of the loans.380  The first inquiry is “whether the [promissory] 
notes qualify under the regular SSI resource-counting rules as cash loans or 
promissory notes [under] the [POMS].”381  If the notes do not qualify under 
either category, then the second inquiry would be whether the notes are 
considered trust-like devices pursuant to the POMS § 1120.201.382  To be a cash 
loan, permitted under the Medicaid regulations, “the instrument must be a 
‘negotiable, bona fide loan agreement.’”383  Furthermore, an informal loan may 
qualify as bona fide if it meets the following conditions: “(1) it is enforceable 
under state law, (2) was in effect at the time the cash proceeds were provided, 
(3) there is an acknowledgement of an obligation to repay, (4) there is a plan for 
repayment, and (5) the repayment plan is feasible.”384 
The Third Circuit upheld the holding of the district court that the applicants 
had failed to demonstrate that the promissory notes were bona fide.385  The court 
stated, “[t]he lack of evidence of feasibility of repayment is sufficient, in itself, 
to support a finding that plaintiffs’ notes likely fail the POMS test for a bona fide 
loan agreement.”386   The Third Circuit also agreed with the district court’s 
finding that 
(1) the loans were not arms-length transactions, (2) the loans were 
informal between family members not in the business of lending money, (3) 
that some of the children had power of attorney over their parents, (4) 
the loans are not backed by collateral and there was no documentation 
about the borrowers’ ability to repay the loans, (5) the timing of the 
loans made prior to the filing of the applications was suspicious, and (6) 
                                                             
 377. Id. 
 378. Id. 
 379. Id. 
 380. Id. at 76. 
 381. Id. 
 382. Id. 
 383. Id. 
 384. Id. (citing SOC. SEC. ADMIN., PROGRAM OPERATIONS MANUAL SYSTEM (POMS) § 
1120.220(C) (2015), https://secure.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/0501120200). 
 385. Id. 
 386. Id. 
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the loans were in the exact amount of excess resources preventing 
Medicaid eligibility. 387 
Even though POMS provides instructions to the Medicaid official to “assume, 
absent evidence to the contrary, that the written agreement is bona fide and 
negotiable,”388 there were sufficient facts to the contrary to demonstrate that the 
loans were not bona fide.389 
In addition to holding that the loans were not bona fide, the Third Circuit 
affirmed that the holding of the district court that the notes executed between the 
parents and the children were fiduciary in nature.390  That is, that the parents and 
children did not meet their burden of “showing that it was more likely than not 
that a fiduciary relationship did not exist between the parents and children.”391  
The notes executed between the parties could be viewed as having an implicit 
“understanding that the children would simply hold the money for the benefit of 
the parents.”392   Because trust-like devices must be considered as available 
resources to applicants for Medicaid, these assets prevent the applicant from 
qualifying for benefits. 
V.  STATUTORY RECOMMENDATION 
Because Medicaid is a joint federal and state program, it is both 
understandable and expected that issues pertaining to eligibility would be 
resolved on a case-by-case basis among the various states.  Such a practice is 
endemic to federalism.  But it is arguable that certain benefits describable as 
essential to due process protection should be uniform throughout the states by 
force of federal law.393  Long-term care benefits are entitled to due process 
protection. 394   Statistics confirm that an increasing number of citizens will 
                                                             
 387. Id. at 76–77. 
 388. Id. at 77 (quoting PROGRAM OPERATIONS MANUAL SYSTEM (POMS), supra note 384 at 
§ 1140.300(D)(1) (2013), https://secure.ssa.gov/apps10/poms.nsf/lnx/0501140300). 
 389. Id.  For example, “the notes may have been entered into with the purpose of attaining 
Medicaid eligibility, not to make loans.”  Id. 
 390. Id. 
 391. Id.  The court also cites Clyde v. Hodge, 460 F.2d 532, 535 (3d Cir. 1972) (stating that a 
court must consider “surrounding facts and circumstances relevant to [each] case”) and United 
Jersey Bank v. Kensey, 704 A.2d 38, 44 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) (commenting that parties 
can maintain a trust in one another because of their relationship to each other). 
 392. Sable, 437 F. App’x at 77. 
 393. See, e.g., Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 48‒50 (1981) (holding that federal 
regulations that permit states to “deem” income according to an arbitrary formula to impute a 
spouse’s income are valid, but noting that such validity results from the broad authority of federal 
officials to make intelligible the Byzantine Social Security Act). 
 394. See Jennifer L. Wright, Unconstitutional or Impossible: The Irreconcilable Gap Between 
Managed Care and Due Process in Medicaid and Medicare, 17 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 
135, 160 (2000) (observing that “government entitlements have long been recognized as property 
rights, requiring due process protection”).  See also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970) 
(stating that statutory entitlements for qualified persons are subject to some due process 
protections). 
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require long-term care and be unable to pay for institutional care, and few of 
these will be aware of long-term care insurance and be unable to afford it when 
payment is required.395  Recipients of care are dependent upon the benefits 
provided by Medicaid, and recipients’ spouses, minor or dependent children, and 
extended families have grown complacent with assets coveted by estate recovery 
efforts.396  The necessity and reliance of long-term care benefits justifies an 
immediate federal statutory structure to cure the disparities that have arisen 
within the states pertaining to eligibility of long-term care. 
Estate recovery and the three issues discussed in this Article illustrate the 
disparity among the states.397   First, by permitting states to elect a broader 
definition of what constitutes the estate of the deceased individual, the state 
permits one state to adopt a more expansive definition than the other, resulting 
in disparity of benefits.398  This issue is augmented by state statutes that are 
poorly drafted, thereby excluding assets that would be included for eligibility 
purposes in other states.399  Second, the debate over the requirement that an asset 
be available at the time of death of the Medicaid recipient seems reminiscent of 
litigation over recovering the value of assets transferred by a spouse prior to 
death.400 
How may the state assist a surviving spouse to recover validly transferred 
items of value, thereby decreasing the surviving spouse’s elective share?  The 
Uniform Probate Code proposed that any property over $12,000 in value that 
was transferred to any single donee within two years of the donor’s death be 
included within the elective share of the surviving spouse.401  The federal statute 
or POMS regulations could implement a similar arrangement to lessen the 
disparity of estate recovery applicable in one state and not in another because 
one state is permitted to include transferred items under the auspices of the 
transfer being an “other arrangement.”402  Finally, the transferability of annuities 
receives disparate treatment among the states, resulting in denial of anticipated 
benefits and depriving persons of reliable planning options.403 
It is possible that recommendations could be made to each of the states to draft 
their estate recovery statutes to accommodate the issues raised in this Article, 
                                                             
 395. Andrew Melnyk & Harsh Sharma, Who Will Pay for Our Long-Term Care?, AM. 
COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURERS 1‒2 (2014). 
 396. See supra note 113 and accompanying text (discussing the surprise and dismay some 
families may face when states attempt to engage in estate recovery). 
 397. See supra Parts II‒IV. 
 398. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) (2012).  See also supra Part II. 
 399. Compare Hines v. Dep’t of Pub. Aid, 850 N.E.2d 148, 152‒53 (Ill. 2006) (applying strict 
construction of a poorly drafted statue), with In re Estate of Thompson, 586 N.W.2d 847, 850 (N.D. 
1998) (utilizing an expansive approach to its state statute).  See also supra Part II. 
 400. See supra Part III. 
 401. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-205(3)(C) (amended 2010).  For commentary see O’Brien, supra 
note 138, at 669–71. 
 402. See supra Part III (discussing the McCormick and Berg decisions). 
 403. See supra Part IV (analyzing spousal annuities). 
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but this is not timely and would be injurious to the due process rights of persons 
affected.  A better approach would be to urge Congress to initiate changes to the 
Medicaid law.  First, the estate of the recipient must include all property owned 
by the decedent at the time of his death, including probate, nonprobate, and 
assets transferred inter vivos and not present at the time of death.  Second, 
annuities safeguard a comparable lifestyle for the non-institutionalized spouse, 
and precise language should be enacted to preserve this option in spite of any 
remote possibility of transferability.  The amicus brief of HHS supports this 
approach, but Congress must provide for this through statutory enactment or 
regulations.404 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
A number of factors combine to necessitate this Article.  The greater longevity 
of an increasing number of Americans precipitates economic pressure on federal 
and state entitlement programs.405  One of these programs—Medicaid—offers 
payment for long-term care, care that often costs thousands of dollars per 
month.406  Because Medicaid is a joint federal-state effort, states must provide 
at least some of the money to pay for these expenses, but they are limited in how 
they may determine an applicant’s eligibility and how they may recover from an 
applicant’s estate upon the applicant’s death. 407   Time and practice have 
established rules and procedures governing eligibility guidelines, but changes in 
the manner of transferring property at death make estate recovery programs 
tentative and inconsistent among the states.408 
Inconsistency in providing benefits is not insignificant.  For some persons 
applying for eligibility, ignorance of the law may result in loss of benefits 
because the applicant’s state may treat an annuity as an asset, whereas another 
state will not.409  Likewise, some persons may be successful in transferring 
assets inter vivos and safeguarding those assets for posterity; others may have 
assets taken for expenditures made long after the long-term care recipient’s 
death. 410   Furthermore, because of the significance of these benefits to an 
                                                             
 404. See Brief for the Amicus Curiae, supra note 359, at 16, 18. 
 405. See supra notes 1‒8 and accompanying text. 
 406. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
 407. Federal contributions to Medicaid expenditures may not be less than fifty percent in any 
state and they may not exceed eighty-three percent.  See EARL DIRK HOFFMAN, JR., BARBARA S. 
KLEES & CATHERINE A. CURTIS, OFFICE OF THE ACTUARY CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID 
SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., BRIEF SUMMARIES OF MEDICARE & 
MEDICAID: TITLE XVIII AND TITLE XIX OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT AS OF NOVEMBER 1, 2008 
23 (2008), http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicareProgramRatesStats/downloads/MedicareMedicaid 
Summaries2008.pdf.  See also MITCHELL & BAUMRUCKER, supra note 10, at 2 (indicating a 
statutory maximum of eighty-three percent and statutory minimum of fifty percent). 
 408. See supra Part I.  See also supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
 409. See supra Part IV. 
 410. See supra Part III. 
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increasing number of persons, issues of due process arise. 411   This Article 
recommends that Congress enacts legislation or implement regulations to 
safeguard uniformity among the states as they provide long-term care benefits 




































                                                             
 411. See supra notes 1‒8, 394 and accompanying text. 
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